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EVIDENCE
WILLIAM M. HICKS* and JOSEPH M. MATTHEWS**
The authors examine the new Florida Evidence Code
through a comparative analysis of the Code, pre-Code Florida
case and statutory law, and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
article identifies possible sources of difficulty in mechanical ap-
plication of Code rules and offers some practical suggestions in
these areas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 1976, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida
Evidence Code' (Code) which is to become effective July 1, 1978.
Much like the Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules), the Code
is designed to bring together in one codification the case and statu-
tory law which in the past governed the admission and exclusion of
evidence in the courts of the State of Florida.
The purpose of this article is to explore the Code. We will treat
each article of the Code separately and analyze each in the following
manner: 1) describe each rule and explain the mechanics of its
application; 2) compare and contrast each rule with the prior law
of Florida; 3) compare and contrast each rule with its federal coun-
* Partner, law firm of Colson & Hicks; former President of the Academy of Florida Trial
Lawyers, 1973-1974; author, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR FLORIDA LAWYERS (1970).
** Articles and Comments Editor, Univerisity of Miami Law Review.
1. FLA. STAT. § 90.101-.958 (Supp. 1976). Professor Charles' W. Ehrhardt, who was the
reporter to the Florida Law Revision Council for the Proposed Florida Evidence Code, wrote
an instructive article which highlighted and explained several of the more controversial
provisions in the code. 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 681 (1974). His article generally offers persuasive
arguments in favor of the Code provisions discussed. It is hoped that this article will further
explain to the bar the extent to which the Code will alter prior law.
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terpart; and 4) provide some practical assistance to the lawyer on
use of the Code.
A note of caution to the reader is in order. The 1977 legislature
moved the effective date of the Code to 1978. Therefore, this article
must be sent to press well before the effective date of the Florida
Evidence Code. Consequently, when using this article, be certain to
determine if the 1977 Legislature has subsequently changed any
provisions of the Code.
II. ARTICLE 1-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The act which gave birth to the Florida Evidence Code created
sections 90.101 through 90.958 of the Florida Statutes and repealed
most of former chapters 90 and 92,2 which represented the primary
statutory provisions concerning evidence previously existing in Flor-
ida. The act also transferred certain sections of former chapter 90
into present chapter 92.
3
Sections 101 through 108 of new chapter 90 contain general
provisions, some of which have substantive significance. Section 101
is the Short Title. Section 102 dictates that the Code "shall replace
and supersede existing statutory or common law in conflict with its
provisions."' This provision results in every evidentiary problem
giving rise to a simple, two-pronged analysis. First, one must deter-
mine whether the issue is governed by a provision of the Code. If
so, the issue should be resolved by interpreting the legislative intent
underlying the Code provision.' Second, if the issue presented does
not find resolution in the Code, then reference must be made to
prior statutory and common law principles.
Section 103(1) provides that the Code applies in the same pro-
ceedings in which the general law of evidence previously applied.
Consequently, prior law must be consulted to determine whether
the Code will be authority in any particular administrative, or other
proceeding. Furthermore, section 103(1) combined with rule 501 of
2. Repealed were FLA. STAT. §§ 90.04-.06, .08-.10, .241-.243; FLA. STAT. §§ 92.01-.04, .10-
121, .22, .35-.37.
3. Transferred and renumbered were Florida Statutes sections 90.01, .011, .02, .14, .141,
.15, .231, .25.
4. FLA. STAT. § 90.102 (Supp. 1976).
5. Of course, the legislative intent will in most instances be evidenced by the legisla-
ture's acceptance or rejection of the prior case law.
(Vol. 31:951
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the Federal Rules' dictates that the witness privileges provided by
article 5 of the Code7 will apply to federal courts in Florida.,
Section 103(2) makes it clear that the Code applies to both civil
and criminal actions unless specifically stated otherwise. Section
103(3) preserves the parole evidence rule.'
Section 104 lays out the appropriate procedure for rulings on
evidence. In order to reverse a judgment on the basis of the admis-
sion or exclusion of evidence, a substantial right of the party must
be adversely affected. In addition, a timely objection with specific
grounds therefore (unless the grounds were apparent from the con-
text) must have been made if the ruling admitted evidence; or when
the evidence was excluded, an offer of proof must have been made,
unless the substance was clear from the context.'"
The requirement that a substantial right be affected is essen-
tially the same as the general common law requirement that the
error result in a miscarriage of justice before a judgment is re-
versed." The Federal Rules contain the same requirement.'" The
requirement of a timely objection accompanied by specific grounds
also mirrors the common law' 3 and the Federal Rules.' 4 The same is
true of the offer of proof.'"
The Code also contains the standard provisions that the trial
6. FED. R. EVID. 501. This rule provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdi-
vision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
7. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.501-.510 (Supp. 1976).
8. The desirability of applying the state law of privileges is discussed in the analysis of
section 504 of article 5. See text accompanying notes 130-38 infra.
9. FLA. STAT. § 90.103(3) (Supp. 1976).
10. FA. STAT. § 90.104(1) (Supp. 1976).
11. Jennings v. Pope, 101 Fla. 1476, 136 So. 471 (1931); S. GARD, FLORIDA EVIDENCE, rule
498 (1967). See also FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1975).
12. FED. R. Evw. 103(a).
13. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Merritt, 55 Fla. 462, 46 So. 1024 (1908); S. GARD, supra
note 11, at rule 494-95.
14. FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(1).
15. Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla. 708, 48 So. 410 (1909); S. GARD, supra
note 11, at rule 496. See also FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2), 3(b).
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be conducted to prevent inadmissible evidence from getting to the
jury by any means. 6 The court may also always take notice of fun-
damental errors affecting substantial rights, even when they are not
brought to the court's attention. 7
Section 105 provides that the court determine preliminary
questions concerning qualification of a witness, existence of a privi-
lege, or admissibility of evidence."8 Also, the court can make prelim-
inary findings of relevancy conditioned on subsequent production of
essential facts'9 and hearings of preliminary matters can be held
outside the hearing of the jury when the interests of justice so re-
quire.2o
The Code, in section 105, fails to dictate whether the trial judge
is bound by the rules of evidence in making preliminary determina-
tions. The federal rule provides that the rules of evidence do not
apply at this stage, except those with respect to privileges.2 ' As a
practical matter, it would be impossible for a judge to follow all of
the rules of evidence in making such preliminary determinations.
Consequently, the absence of any provision in the Code should not
be interpreted as requiring the judge to perform this impossible
task. However, the rules governing privileges ought to be followed
as much as possible.
The Code also fails to protect an accused who testifies on a
preliminary matter from cross-examination as to other issues in the
case.22 In light of the broad scope of cross-examination that may be
allowed at the judge's discretion,23 the accused should be afforded
the protections extended by Federal Rule 104(d). This protection
would insure full participation by the accused during preliminary
determinations.
Section 106 prohibits the judge from summing up the evidence
or commenting on the weight or credibility of witnesses or the guilt
16. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(2) (Supp. 1976). See also FED. R. EVID. 103(c).
17. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(3) (Supp. 1976). See also FED. R. EvID. 103(d).
18. FLA. STAT. § 90.105(1) (Supp. 1976). See also FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
19. FLA. STAT. § 90.105(2) (Supp. 1976). See also FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
20. FLA. STAT. § 90.105(3) (Supp. 1976). This section mandates that all hearings on the
admissibility of confessions be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. See also FED. R. EVID.
104(c).
21. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 104(d). This rule provides: "The accused does not, by testifying
upon a preliminary matter, subject himself to cross-examination as to other issues in the
case.
23. FLA. STAT. § 90.612(2) (Supp. 1976).
[Vol. 31:951
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of the accused. This section reflects the common law rule in Flor-
ida, 4 but differs from the federal practice. 5 Reacting to the fact that
most states were in accord with the Florida rule, a "proposed" fed-
eral rule2" codifying the federal practice was eliminated from the
final version of the Federal Rules of Evidence enacted by Congress.
A careful analysis of the relative merits of these opposing views is
beyond the scope of this article, however, the authors feel the better
rule is the one followed in Florida. 7
Section 107 is the standard provision for limited admissibility.
It requires the judge, upon request, to instruct the jury on the proper
scope of evidence that is admissible for a limited purpose. This
section represents both the common law rule" and the federal rule. 9
The last section in article 1 is also a standard provision for
introduction by an adverse party of the remainder of a writing, or
related writings, when the opponent offers to place only a portion
of the writing into evidence. 0 This provision also represents both the
common law3 and federal rule.32
Article 1 provides a general set of guidelines for the procedural
application of the subsequent articles. It does not alter the common
law to any significant degree, and with the exception of the prohibi-
24. See generally HICKS, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR FLORIDA LAWYERS, §§ 12-15 (1970).
25. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899).
26. The "proposed" federal rule provided:
After the close of the evidence and arguments of counsel, the judge may fairly and
impartially sum up the evidence and comment to the jury upon the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, if he also instructs the jury that they
are to determine for themselves the weight of the evidence and the credit to be
given to the witnesses and that they are not bound by the judge's summation or
comment.
FED. R. EvID., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 105 (West) (as prescribed
by the Supreme Court).
Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees were careful to note that they were
not overruling the prior federal practice. They merely wanted to avoid deciding which was
the better rule and leave the subject for separate consideration at a later time.
Hereinafter, all references to "proposed" Federal Rules of Evidence include those rules
which Congress chose not to include in the final version enacted into law.
27. For further discussion of this issue, see Wright, The Invasion of Jury: Temperature
of the War, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 137 (1953).
28. Barnett v. Butler, 112 So. 2d 907, 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959); HICKS, supra note 24, at
§ 524.
29. FED. R. EvID. 105.
30. FLA. STAT. § 90.108 (Supp. 1976).
31. 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2102-2125 (3d ed. 1940).
32. FED. R. EVID. 106.
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tion against the trial judge commenting on the evidence, it is similar
to its federal counterpart.
III. ARTICLE 2-JUDICIAL NOTICE
Article 2 governs judicial notice of facts. Facts subject to judi-
cial notice are divided into two categories: those which the court
must notice,33 and those which the court may notice. 4
Section 203 of article 2, however, provides a procedure by which
a party can compel the court to notice those facts which fall in the
33. FLA. STAT. § 90.201 (Supp. 1976). This section provides:
A court shall take judicial notice of:
(1) Decisional, constitutional, and pub6c statutory law anid rosolutions of the
Florida Legislature and the Congress of the United States.
(2) Ordinances and municipal and county charters, the enforcement of which is
within the jurisdiction of the court.
(3) Florida rules of court that have statewide application, its own rules, and the
rules of United States courts adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
(4) Rules of court of the United States Supreme Court and of the United States
Courts of Appeal.
34. FLA. STAT. § 90.212 (Supp. 1976). This section provides:
A court may take judicial notice of the following matters, to the extent that they
are not embraced within § 90.201:
(1) Special, local, and private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United
States and of the Florida Legislature.
(2) Decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law of every other state,
territory, and jurisdiction of the United States.
(3) Contents of the Federal Register.
(4) Laws of foreign nations and of an organization of nations.
(5) Official actions of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the
United States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(6) Records of any court of this state or any court of record of the United States
or of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(7) Rules of court of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United
States or of any other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(8) Provisions of all municipal and county charters and charter amendments of
this state, provided that they are available in printed copies or as certified copies.
(9) Rules promulgated by governmental agencies of this state which are pub-
lished in the Forida Administrative Code or in bound written copies.
(10) Duly enacted ordinances and resolutions of municipalities and counties
located in Florida, provided that such ordinances and resolutions are available
in printed copies or as certified copies.
(11) Facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the. court.
(12) Facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are capable
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.
(13) Official seals of governmental agencies and departments of the United
States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
[Vol. 31:951
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second category. Pursuant to this statutory scheme if the requesting
party (1) gives each adverse party notice of the request so that the
adverse party can refute the request, and (2) furnishes the court
with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice, the
court must do so."
Section 204 establishes safeguards to prevent prejudice to the
party against whom notice is taken. It provides that each party
must be afforded an opportunity to present evidence on the pro-
priety of taking the notice; that the court is not bound by any
exclusionary rules, but rather, may use any source of pertinent and
reliable information in deciding whether to notice a fact; and that
each party be given an opportunity to challenge any documentary
source of information the court relies on in making its determina-
tion .
3
Prior to the Code, it was apparently common practice to allow
the parties to dispute the propriety of taking notice of a particular
fact.37 In addition, courts have never been bound by exclusionary
rules in making such a decison. 38 The Code's establishment of a
specific procedure, therefore, seems helpful in insuring that notice
not be taken improvidently.
Section 206 provides that the court shall instruct the jury to
accept as a fact any matter judicially noticed. Unlike the Federal
Rules, the Code does not distinguish between criminal and civil
juries. The Federal Rules do not compel a criminal jury to accept a
judicially noticed fact.39 The failure of the Code to make such provi-
sion for criminal juries may be contrary to the spirit of the sixth
amendment. 0
The issue of whether evidence should be admitted in disproof
of facts which have been judicially noticed was a subject of much
dispute when the Federal Rules were being promulgated.4 The Fed-
eral Rules generally do not allow evidence in disproof to be admit-
ted; however, they draw the above-noted distinction allowing dis-
35. See also FED. R. EvID. 201(d).
36. A comparable federal provision appears in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 201(e).
37. See S. GARD, supra note 11, at rule 79, Author's Comment.
38. Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619 (Fla. 1917); S. G AD, supra note 11, at rule
79; HICKS, supra note 24, at § 209.
39. FED. R. EvID. 201(g).
40. See FED. R. EVID. 201(g), Adivsory Comm. Note, subdivision (g).
41. See, e.g., McNaughton, Judicial Notice - Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-
Whitmore Controversy, 14 VAND. L. Rxv. 779 (1961).
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proof in criminal cases. The Federal Rules also distinguish between
adjudicative facts and legislative facts.42 Those who argued in favor
of admitting evidence in disproof were generally concerned with
notice of legislative facts.'3 Since the Federal Rules only govern
adjudicative facts, the controversy was dissipated somewhat."
The Florida Code provision seems to revitalize this controversy.
Its liberal notice provisions apparently govern legislative as well as
adjudicative facts; consequently, there are now strong arguments in
favor of admitting evidence in disproof of noticed facts. 5 Such evi-
dence, however, is not allowed under section 206.
It would be desirable for the legislature to clarify article 2 con-
cerning this issue. In the absence of such legislative relief, courts
hopefully will insure fairness to the parties by permitting evidence
in dispute of judicially noticed legislative facts.
As noted previously, section 201 lists matters which must be
noticed, and section 202 lists matters which may be noticed. The
specific listing of matters in these two sections reflects the approach
of the prior Florida statutory" and common law."7 Rather than com-
paring the listings in sections 201 and 202 with the prior rules, we
suggest that the lawyer consult this list when confronted with an
attempt to notice any matter which in the past has been subject to
notice.
The final provisions worthy of comment in article 2 are con-
tained in subsections (11) and (12) of section 202. These subsections
codify the previously existing case law which provided that a court
may notice "facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because
they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court,"'" or because they are "capable of accurate and ready deter-
42. This terminology was coined by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. Adjudicative facts
are the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts are those which have relevance to legal
reasoning and the lawmaking process. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. Rav. 364, 404-07 (1942). Seealso FED. R. EvID. 201,
Advisory Comm. Note.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 442 F.2d 698, 711 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg & Smith,
JJ., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Ovalle v. United States, 404 U.S. 845 (1971).
44. See FED. R. EvID. 201, Adivisory Comm. Note, subdivision (g).
45. For a discussion of these arguments, see Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based
on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPEcriVES OF LAW 69, 76-77 (1964). Compare Makos v.
Prince, 64 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953) with Schriver v. Tucker, 42 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1949).
46. FLA. STAT. § 92.01-.40 (1975), repealed in part, 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237.
47. See HICKS, supra note 24, at §§ 212-29.
48. FLA. STAT. § 90.202(11) (Supp. 1976); see Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953);
Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619 (1917); S. GARD, supra note 11, at rule 61; HICKS,
[Vol. 31:951
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mination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned."4 These subsections are identical to those in the Fed-
eral Rules. 0
The Code's treatment of judicial notice is certain to raise dis-
putes when courts notice matters in criminal trials. Furthermore,
the Code's seemingly absolute prohibition of the introduction of
evidence in dispute of noticed matters may rekindle the debate over
the fairness of such a rule.
IV. ARTICLE 3-PRESUMPTIONS
Article 3, which governs the law of presumptions, attempts to
clarify this very murky area of the law of evidence.
Section 301 defines a presumption as "an assumption of fact
which the law makes from the existence of another fact or group of
facts found or otherwise established."'" This section also provides
that presumptions are rebuttable, unless it appears from the law
which creates them that they are intended to be conclusive.5"
The Code takes a very interesting approach in prescribing the
effect of presumptions. Section 302 provides that every rebuttable
presumption is either one affecting only the burden of producing
evidence, or one which has the effect of shifting the ultimate burden
of proof as to the presumed fact to the party against whom the
presumption operates. Section 303 then dictates that in civil pro-
ceedings "a presumption established primarily to facilitate the de-
termination of the particular action in which the presumption is
applied, rather than to implement public policy, is a presumption
affecting the burden of producing evidence." All presumptions
which do not fall within this definition are presumptions affecting
the burden of proof. 3
supra note 24, at § 208.
49. FLA. STAT. § 90.202(12) (Supp. 1976); see Tyrus v. Apalachicola N. R.R., 130 So. 2d
580 (Fla. 1961); S. GARD, supra note 11, at rule 61.
50. FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
51. FLA. STAT. § 90.301(1) (Supp. 1976).
52. FLA. STAT. § 90.301(2) (Supp. 1976). A conclusive presumption is actually a rule of
subtstantive law. For example, many states have a conclusive presumption that when a man
and woman are married and living together, any child conceived by the woman is the child
of the husband. The purpose for this presumption is that the law does not want to facilitate
proof of illegitimacy. J.R. WALTZ, THE NEw FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 23 (2d ed. 1975).
53. FLA. STAT. § 90.304 (Supp.1976). For purposes of this article, there is a distinction
between the burden of proof (persuasion) and burden of production (going forward). The
1977]
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The Code's approach deftly handles the debate that has raged
for years among scholars as to the effect that a presumption ought
to have. Professor Thayer and Professor Wigmore argued that a
presumption should disappear upon production of evidence suffi-
cient to support a finding that the presumed fact does not exist.54
Their arguments came to be known as the "bursting bubble" theory.
More recently, however, Professor Morgan and Professor McCor-
mick have argued that the same policy considerations that go into
determining the allocation of burdens of proof go into the creation
of presumptions. Therefore, the effect of a presumption should be
to shift the burden of proof.5" Prior to the adoption of the Code,
Florida courts followed the general rule that presumptions do not
shift the burden of proof." In those few cases where Florida courts
have held that presumptions shift the burden of proof, the courts
were dealing with presumptions that other states deem to be conclu-
sive. 57
The tortured history of article 3 of the Federal Rules dealing
with presumptions is indicative of the complexity of this problem.
The original version supported by the Supreme Court took the view
that presumptions should shift the burden of proof.5" The version
recommended by the House of Representatives took an intermedi-
ary view under which a presumption could be considered evidence
by the trier of fact and weighed against the evidence that was intro-
duced against it.5" The final version eventually adopted by the fed-
former shifts to the party against whom the presumption operates, the burden of disproving
the presumed fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of production relates only
to the necessity of coming forward with sufficient evidence so as not to have an action
dismissed by a motion for a directed verdict.
54. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 313-52 (1898);
9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2485-2493 (3d ed. 1940).
55. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
LIGATION 81 (1956); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 345 (2d ed. 1972).
56. In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697, 703 (Fla. 1971); Leonetti v. Boone, 74 So.
2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1954).
57. Compare Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163 (1944) with the discussion
of conclusive presumptions in note 52, supra.
58. FED. R. EVID., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 301 (West ed)
(as prescribed by Supreme Court).
59. FED. R. EVID., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 301 (West) (as
passed by House of Representatives). This "presumption as evidence" approach was rejected
in the final version passed by Congress on the basis of an unsatisfactory experience with the




eral rules returns to the "bursting bubble" approach"
Theoretically the approach of the Florida Code avoids the
Thayer-Morgan debate and is logically appealing. In practice, how-
ever, the mechanics of its application may be overly complicated.
First, the lawyer who desires to benefit from a presumption must
establish the basic facts from which the presumption is made, Thee
basic facts may be subject to dispute, and the jury may ultimately
be called on to determine their existence.
Second, the lawyer must present arguments to the judge as to
the purpose behind the presumption. Presentation of these argu-
ments will be difficult where the presumption is statutory. It will
be all the more difficult when the presumption is one created by the
common law. Lawyers will find language in the cases indicating that
some presumptions were created both to facilitate the production of
evidence and to implement some public policy." In such a case the
trial judge must determine which is the major purpose behind the
presumption. These determinations will produce additional issues
for appeal, and care must be taken that they are preserved in the
record.
Third, once the judge makes his determination as to the pur-
pose of the presumption, he must be prepared to instruct the jury.
Assuming the jury finds that the basic facts exist, if the presump-
tion is one affecting the burden of proof, the court must instruct the
jury that the existence of the presumed fact is to be assumed unless
the party against whom the presumption operates meets his burden
of disproving the presumed fact. If on the other hand, the presump-
tion is one that only shifts the burden of producing evidence, the
judge must determine whether sufficient evidence has been pre-
sented to sustain a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact.
If the judge finds such evidence, the presumption disappears, and
the jury is instructed without reference to the presumption.2
As noted above, by adding the necessity of determining the
60. FED. R. EVID. 301.
61. E.g., Contracts regular'on their face are assumed to have been properly executed
and to have included in their execution all formalities essential to their validity. 29 AM. JuR.
2d Evidence § 247 (1967). Is the purpose for this presumption a public policy intention to
respect contractual obligations* or is it an attempt to facilitate the determination of particular
actions involving written contracts? Is it both?
62. This discussion of the mechanics of the application of presumptions is cursory. For
a more in-depth discussion, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.301-.304 West Special Pamphlet 1976),
Sponsors' Note.
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purpose behind the presumption to the already complicated task of
applying presumptions in a trial, the Code's approach may be too
complex to be effective. Hopefully, complexity will not prove to be
an obstacle. If the trial bar is disciplined and systematic in its
efforts to make use of presumptions, the job of the bench will be
made far easier, and the approach of the Code may provide a good
example for other jurisdictions to follow.
There are two additional points of interest regarding article 3.
First, it is important to distinguish between presumptions and infer-
ences. A presumption is an assumption of fact which operates as a
matter of law. An inference is a "deduction of fact that the fact-
finder, in his discretion, may logically draw from another fact or
group of facts that are found to exist .... "613 Section 301 notes that
the Code has no affect whatsoever on the right of juries to draw
inferences.
Second, article 3 dictates the affect of presumptions in civil
cases only. In this respect, the Florida approach is like that of Con-
gress, which rejected "proposed" Federal Rule 303.64 This
"proposed" rule would have required courts to treat presumptions
differently in criminal matters. However, Congress declined to
enact it because the subject was being considered at the time as part
of the revision of the federal criminal code. Since the Florida Code
does not govern presumptions in criminal cases, reference must be
made to preexisting law for this matter.
V. ARTICLE 4-RELEVANCY
Article 4 governs questions of relevancy. The first two sections
establish the basic rule of relevancy. Section 401 defines relevant
evidence as "evidence tending to prove or disprove a material
fact." Section 402 provides that "[aill relevant evidence is admis-
sible, except as provided by law."6 The rest of the sections in article
4 and the remaining articles in the Code set forth specific rules
requiring exclusion of certain evidence despite its relevance, based
on reasons of public policy.
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.301 (Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsor's Note.
64. FED. R. EVID., Appendix of Deleted and' Superseded Materials Rule 303 (West) (as
prescribed by the Supreme Court).
65. FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (Supp. 1976).
66. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (Supp. 1976).
67. There are also constitutional limitations that require exclusion of evidence. See, e.g.,
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The Code's definition of relevancy is apparently intended to
codify prior case law. The Sponsors' Note to section 401, citing
Zabner v. Howard Johnson's Inc.,8 defines relevant evidence as
"evidence that has a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove a
given proposition that is material as shown by the pleadings. [It is]
a tendency to establish a fact in controversy or to render a proposi-
tion more or less probable." 9
One very important difference appears between the Code defi-
nition and the cited case. The case definition requires that the fact
be in dispute. This requirement was the subject of some analysis in
the debate over the federal rules and resulted in its rejection in the
final draft.70 Similarly, the Code provision does not require that the
fact be in dispute.
The significance of this requirement should not be underesti-
mated. Charts, photographs, murder weapons and other items of
evidence often relate to a fact that is not in dispute. Such items
should not be subject to an absolute rule of exclusion. Hopefully, the
courts will read the Code provision strictly and avoid unnecessary
questions over admission of such background evidence.
The Code definition of relevant evidence differs from the fed-
eral rule in one interesting respect. The federal rule uses the phrase
"fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action" in
place of the word "material." The reason the federal rules chose not
to use "material" is because of the word's ambiguity.7 The concept
of materiality is so engrained in the trial bar, however, eliminating
it from the statutory language would probably be of little conse-
quence. It is more important that the bar and the bench continue
to require precision in stating the grounds for objection to the ad-
mission of evidence. Such precision should foster elimination of the
term's ambiguity.
The basic rule of relevancy as prescribed by the first two sec-
tions of the Code should not pose any major new problems for the
trial lawyer. As Professor James suggests,
[rielevancy is [a] formal relation between two propositions. To
determine the relevancy of an offered item of evidence one must
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure is not
admissible).
68. 227 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
69. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.401 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Notes.
70. FED. R. EVID. 401, Advisory Comm. Note.
71. Id.
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first discover to what proposition it is supposed to be relevant.
This requires analysis of the express or tacit argument of counsel.
Then, since evidence is admissible only if relevant to a material
proposition, analysis of the pleadings and applicable substantive
law is required to determine whether the proposition ultimately
sought to be proved is material. Having isolated the material
proposition sought to be proved, we still must determine whether
the evidentiary proposition is relevant to it-does tend to prove
it. This tendency to prove can be demonstrated only in terms of
some general proposition, based most often on the practical expe-
rience of the judge and jurors as men, sometimes upon generaliza-
tions of science introduced into the trial to act as connecting
links."7
The role of the lawyer is still, as it always has been, to assure that
those connecting links are present when he seeks to establish the
relevancy of his evidence.
When the admissibility of evidence has been established under
the basic rule of relevancy in sections 401 and 402, reference must
be made to the remaining sections in article 4 to determine if the
evidence must be excluded because of some overriding policy con-
sideration. Section 403 provides that if the probative value of rele-
vant evidence "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence," it is inad-
missible.73
Prior Florida case law apparently gave the trial judge discretion
to exclude evidence based on the reasons incorporated in section
403.11 This Code section, however, seems to be patterned after Fed-
eral Rule 403, which calls for "balancing the probative value of and
need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from its
admission."75 The trial lawyer must be prepared to argue that this
balance, in any given instance, rests on his side. The effectiveness
of a limiting instruction and the availability of other means of proof
are factors which should be considered when arguing whether evi-
72. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 689, 696 n.15 (1941).
73. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (Supp. 1976).
74. E.g., Young v. State, 234 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1970) (the supreme court found an abuse
of the trial court's discretion in its admission of large numbers of gruesome photographs). See
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.403 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
75. FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Comm. Note.
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dence ought to be excluded on grounds of unfair prejudice. 6Section
404 treats the admissibility of character evidence and 405 dictates
the proper method for such proof. Section 404(1) proscribes use of
general character evidence when such evidence is used to prove that
an individual "acted in conformity with it [his general character]
on a particular Occasion." The policy behind this exclusion is appar-
ently that such evidence is so prejudicial that the prejudice out-
weighs any probative value." When, however, character itself is an
element of a crime, claim or defense, evidence relating to it is admis-
sible."'
This general prohibition against character evidence to show
action in conformity with a person's general character has three
specific exceptions: 1) an accused may offer evidence of a pertinent
trait of his own character and the prosecution may rebut such evi-
dence;7" 2) an accused may offer, except in rape cases,80 evidence of
a pertinent trait of the victim of the crime, and the prosecution may
rebut such evidence;8 and in a homicide case, the prosecution may
introduce evidence showing the peacefulness of a murder victim if
the accused claims the victim was the aggressor;8" and 3) evidence
of the character of a witness may be offered under the provisions of
sections 608-610.
83
Subsection 404(2)(a) prohibits evidence of specific crimes,
wrongs or acts when used solely to show bad character, but permits
such evidence "when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." However, when
the state offers evidence of other crimes for anything but impeach-
ment purposes, it must notify the defendant ten days before trial of
its intent to make such an offering. When such evidence is admit-
76. Id.
77. See Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RuTGEms L. REv. 574, 584
(1956).
78. For example, the chastity of a victim is evidence under a statute specifying her
chastity as an element of the crime of seduction.
79. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1)(a) (Supp. 1976).
80. FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1975). This section provides limited admissibility of character
evidence of the rape victim and establishes a screening procedure whereby the judge hears
such evidence to determine its propriety before it is presented to the jury.
81. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1)(b) (Supp. 1976).
82. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1)(b) (Supp. 1976).
83. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1)(c) (Supp. 1976).
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ted, the court must give the jury a limiting instruction."
The statutory scheme in section 404 generally reflects the prior
Florida law. 5 It differs from Federal Rule 403 only in imposing
safeguards where the state intends to use evidence of prior crimes.
The lawyer, however, should be aware of two subtleties in the provi-
sions of section 404. First, the exception permitting character evi-
dence by an accused concerning his own character in subsection
(1)(a) is limited to criminal actions. This limitation is consistent
with the federal rules and is probably the better rule.8" Second, the
admissibility of evidence of specific crimes, wrongs or acts under
subsection (2)(a) is a discretionary matter. Defense counsel should
be prepared to argue that under section 403 the danger of undue
prejudice outweighs the probative value of evidence in view of the
availability of other means of proof.
Once character evidence is determined to be admissible under
section 404, section 405 dictates that such evidence may be pre-
sented either by testimony about the party's reputation or by testi-
mony in the form of an opinion. It also permits inquiry into specific
instances of conduct when cross-examining the character witness or
when character is an element of the change.
By permitting general character evidence in the form of an
opinion the Code departs from prior Florida law87 and adopts the
approach of the federal rules.88 This change in Florida law elimi-
nates unnecessary complications in the introduction of character
evidence. The trial lawyer may now ask the character witness in
direct fashion what is his opinion of the party's character.
The express allowance of inquiry into specific instances of con-
duct on cross-examination and where character is actually in issue
contemplates that it is not permissible on direct examination of a
character witness. This treatment of specific instances of conduct
comports with prior case law, 8 the Federal Rules," and is proper in
84. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b) (Supp. 1976).
85. For a discussion of the leading Florida precedents see the Sponsors' Note to section
404 of the Code. See also S. GARD, supra note 11, at rule 90-101.
86. For a discussion of the justification for the federal rule see the Advisory Committee's
Note to rule 404.
87. See Maloy v. State, 52 Fla. 101, 41 So. 791 (1906).
88. FED. R. EvID. 405.
89. For a discussion of the Florida precedents see the Sponsor's Note to section 405 of
the Code. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.405 (West Special Pamphelt 1976), Sponsors' Note.
90. FED. R. EVID. 405.
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light of the potential such evidence has for prejudice, confusion and
waste of time.
Sections 406 through 410 treat specific recurring problems of
relevancy. Section 406 permits evidence of the routine practice of
an organization, whether corroborated or not, to prove that it acted
in conformity with the routine on a particular occasion. The Code
provision is in line with the most recent Florida case law on the
issue." It differs, however, from the federal approach; Federal Rule
406, in addition to admitting the routine practice of organizations,
also permits evidence of the habit of a person.
By eliminating the requirement that routine practice of an or-
ganization be corroborated by other evidence, the Code and the
Supreme Court of Florida implicitly accept the reliability of such
evidence. Neither the Code nor the Sponsors' Note, however, give
any reason for not having a similar provision for habits of an individ-
ual. The Sponsors' Note states only that the section does not apply
to the habit of an individual. 2 Habit of an individual and routine
behavior of an organization are equivalents. As Professor McCor-
mick points out, "surely any sensible man in investigating whether
X did a particular act would be greatly helped in his inquiry by
evidence as to whether he was in the habit of doing it." 3
Section 407 makes evidence of subsequent repairs inadmissible
to infer negligence. It is based on the theory that the law does not
want to discourage a person from making repairs to protect against
future injuries. 4
Compromises and offers to compromise are likewise inadmissi-
ble to prove liability for the claim or its value. 5 Any relevant con-
duct or statements made during settlement negotiations are also
91. See, e.g., Brown v. Griffen Indus., Inc., 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1973).
92. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.406 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
93. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 195 (2d ed. 1972). The biggest problem with accepting
evidence of habit is determining what constitutes habit. However, the trial judge could pass
on the adequacy of the sampling and the uniformity of the response and make preliminary
determinations of whether certain evidence achieves the status of habit. See, e.g., Levin v.
United States, 338 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (testimony as to the accused's religious "habits"
offered to show that he was home observing the Sabbath when the crime was committed, was
properly excluded). See also Lewan, The Rationale of Habit Evidence, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv.
39 (1964).
94. See City of Miami Beach v. Wolfe, 83 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1955). See also FED. R. EvD.
407, Advisory Comm. Note.
95. FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (Supp. 1976).
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inadmissible." This latter provision is apparently a departure from
prior case law.9" The Code provision is based on a public policy
which favors settlements. The belief is that permitting admissions
of fact made during negotiations would deter settlement negotia-
tions.98
Section 409 prohibits evidence of payment of medical bills or
expenses to infer liability. It is a standard rule in conformity with
existing case law and the federal rules.9
The final provision in article 4, section 410, prohibits evidence
of pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or statements made in connec-
tion with such pleas, except when such statements are used for
impeachment or in a perjury charge. The purpose for the rule is to
promote plea bargaining.1® .
Conspicuous in its absence from the Code is a provision making
evidence of liability insurance inadmissible. At present the admissi-
bility of evidence of liability insurance must be determined on a
case-by-case basis with reference to the applicable case law and
statutes.'0 '
VI. ARTICLE 5-PRIVILEGES
Article 5 displaces the common law of privileges. It codifies
five of the primary common law privileges: laywer-client,
psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, clergy, and trade secrets.
The Code provisions are extensive in their treatment of the many
intricacies of the law of privileges.
96. Id.
97. See Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bunting, 133 Fla. 646, 183 So. 321
(1938).
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.408 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note. At first
blush the Code's provision'appears sound; however, it possesses some potential for misuse.
Some parties may attempt to immunize certain factual information by producing it during
settlement negotiations. This fear was expressed during the debates on Federal Rule 408 and
resulted in a provision that evidence otherwise discoverable is not excludable merely because
it is presented during negotiations. Florida may want to consider adding a similar clause.
Another difficult problem will be determining the parameters of settlement negotiatons. Such
determinations will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.
99. See Babcock v. Flowers, 144 Fla. 479, 198 So. 326 (1940); FED. R. EvD. 409.
100. See also FED. R. Evm. 410. The provision allowing statements made during plea
bargaining to be used in perjury actions and for impeachment purposes is predicated on a
desire not to allow perjury an immunity. See generally Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
101. Compare Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969) with FLA. STAT. §§
627.7262, 768.50 (Supp. 1976).
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Section 501 begins by eliminating all witness privileges except
those specifically provided by statute or constitution. Previously
existing statutory privileges 0 2 are still effective unless they are re-
pealed by the Code. The most significant privilege repealed by the
Code is the accountant's privilege.'03 No reason is given in the Spon-
sors' Notes for repealing this privilege. Much debate over this issue
is certain to arise, and the lawyer should be aware that the Code
may be subject to change in its exclusion of the accountant's privi-
lege.
The Code does not attempt to govern constitutional privileges,
such as the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and
the fourth amendment ban on use of illegally obtained confessions,
because of their constantly changing nature."4 The lawyer must still
look to case law for the parameters of these privileges.
Section 502 governs the lawyer-client privilege. It does not alter
the common law privilege to any great extent."5 It is also very simi-
lar to the "proposed" federal rule.' Subsection 1 of section 502,
defines the three terms crucial to establishing the privilege: a law-
yer,107 a client'08 and a confidential communication. 0' Subsection 2
sets forth the privilege using the defined terms: "A client has a
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from
disclosing, the contents of confidential communications when such
other person learned of the communications because they were
102. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 405.01.03 (1975) (allows a person or organization to give health
treatment information to research groups but insures confidentiality of the person whose
treatment has been studied).
103. FLA. STAT. § 473.141 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-273.
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.501 (West Speical Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
105. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors'
Note; S. GARD, supra note 11, at rule 422-27; HICKS, supra note 24, at § 207.
106. FED. R. EVID., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 503 (West) (as
prescribed by the Supreme Court).
107. "A 'lawyer' is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be author-
ized, to practice law in any state or nation." FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(a) (Supp. 1976).
108. "A 'client' is any person, public officer, corporation, association, or other organiza-
tion or entity, either public or private, who consults a lawyer with the purpose of obtaining
legal services or who is rendered legal services by a lawyer." FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(b) (Supp.
1976).
109. "A communication between lawyer and client is 'confidential' if it is not intended
to be disclosed to third persons other than:
1. Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to the client.
2. Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication." FLA. STAT. §
90.502(1)(c) (Supp. 1976).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
made in the rendition of legal services to the client."'1 ° Subsection
3 dictates who .may claim the privilege."' Subsection 4 lists five
well-established situations when the privilege may not be
claimed."'
The key to determining whether a particular communication
between a lawyer and his client is privileged is the intent to disclose
information "in furtherance of the rendition of legal services." If the
communication is not in furtherance of legal services to the client,
then the policy behind the privilege-the facilitation of judicial
administration by encouraging free communication between client
and attorney-is not served, and the privilege is not available.
The Code incorporates most of the intricacies of the privilege
as they have developed through case law."' The Sponsors' Note to
110. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(2)(Supp. 1976).
111. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(3) (Supp. 1976). This section provides:
The privilege may be claimed by:
(a) The client.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the client.
(c) The personal representative of a deceased client.
(d) A successor, assignee, trustee in dissolution, or any similar repre-
sentative of an organization, corporation, or association or other ent-
ity, either public or private, whether or not in existence.
(e) The lawyer, but only on behalf of the client. The lawyer's author-
ity to claim the privilege is persumed in the absence of contrary evi-
dence.
112. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4) (Supp. 1976). This section provides:
There is no lawyer-client privilege under this section when:
(a) The services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or
aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew was a
crime or fraud.
(b) A communication is relevant to an issue between parties who
claim through the same deceased client.
(c) A communication is relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the
lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer, arising from the
lawyer-client relationship.
(d) A communication is relevant to an issue concerning the intention
or competence of a client executing an attested document to which the
lawyer is an attesting witness, or concerning the execution or attesta-
tion of the document.
(e) A communication is relevant to a matter of common interest
between two or more clients, or their successors in interest, if the
communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or
consulted in common when offered in a civil action between the clients
or their successors in interest.
113. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note,
subsections (1)-(2). The definition of client includes one who consults an attorney for the
purpose of retaining him, even though employment does not actually result. The privilege is
extended to such communications, reflecting prior case law. Keir v. State, 152 Fla. 389, 11
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section 502 does an excellent job of reviewing the case law develop-
ment. There are, however, two noteworthy aspects about the Code's
privilege that deserve further discussion.
First, the Code changes the common law privilege in one very
important way. The common law held that the privilege did not
apply when a third party overheard the conversation."4 The Code
deems a communication to be confidential "if it is not intended to
be disclosed to third persons.""' The Sponsors' Note indicates that
the reason for this provision is the recent development of sophisti-
cated techniques for eavesdropping. This approach is similar to that
of the "proposed" federal rule"6 and claims to reflect existing state
legislative policy." 7 The wording of the section itself, however,
makes no reference to mechanical eavesdropping techniques. The
Code is not clear on whether the privilege will apply where the
communication takes place in a crowded area, and the client claims
that he did not intend for it to be overheard by someone not a party
to the communication."
8
The second noteworthy aspect of the Code's attorney-client
privilege is its failure to deal with the very difficult problem of who
is to be considered the client for privilege purposes when the client
is an organization. This issue is very important to the lawyer who
represents a corporation, a union, or some other type of organiza-
tion; yet neither the Code nor the Sponsors' Note make any refer-
ence to the problem. In all likelihood, the drafters of the Code in-
So. 2d 886 (1943). The Code also extends the privilege to communications that are channeled
through intermediaries normally used in the communication process. Vann v. State, 85 So.
2d 133 (Fla. 1956). A third example is the Code's inclusion of the common law rule that when
clients with similar interests retain separate lawyers, each client may claim the privilege for
his own statements made during joint conferences, but not for those of the other client.
Dominquez v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 62 Fla. 148, 56 So. 682 (1911).
114. See Horn v. State, 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974); 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
2326 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
115. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(c)(Supp. 1976).
116. FED. R. EvID., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 503(a)(4)
(West) (as prescribed by the Supreme Court).
117. Subsection (2) of the Sponsors' Note makes reference to Florida Statutes section
934.08(4)(Supp. 1976), which provides that privileged communications do not lose their privi-
lege when they are intercepted. However, section 934 deals specifically with interception of
communications by use of an electronic or mechanical device.
118. A more difficult problem might arise when a client has reason'to believe that his
phone is being legally tapped, yet he still communicates to his lawyer information that
facilitates the rendition of legal servicees. Did he intend to disclose the information to a third
party?
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tended to follow the lead of the "proposed" federal rule, which spe-
cifically leaves this problem to a case-by-case resolution."1 9 Regard-
less of the reason for the Code's failure to mention the issue, corpo-
rate counsel should be aware of the issue's existence and of the law
as it has developed in other jurisdictions. 2 '
Section 503 provides a psychotherapist-patient privilege. It is
drafted in the same fashion as section 502. Subsection 1 defines
psychotherapist,' patient' and confidential communication. 3
Subsection 2, by using the defined terms, establishes the privilege:
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent
any other person from disclosing, confidential communications or
records made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his
mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and other
drug addiction, between himself and his psychotherapist, or per-
sons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under
the direction of the psychotherapist. This privilege includes any
diagnosis made, and advice given, by the psychotherapist in the
course of that relationship.'
119. FED. R. EvID., Appendix of Delted and Superseded Materials, Rule 503, Advisory
Comm. Note (West).
120. See generally City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Pa. 1962); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953
(1956); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84
HAav. L. Rav. 424 (1970).
121. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1976). These subsections define a psychoth-
erapist as:
1. A person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably
believed by the patient so to be, who is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of
a mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction;
or
2. A person licensed or certified as a psychologist unner the laws of any state or
nation, who is engaged primarily in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or
emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction.
122. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(b)(Supp. 1976). This subsection defines a patient as "a
person who consults, or is interviewed by, a psychotherapist for purposes of diagnosis or
treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addic-
tion."
123. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c)(Supp. 1976). This subsection provides that
[a) communication between psychotherapist and patient is 'confidential' if it is
not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than:
1. Those persons present to further the interest of the patient in the consulta-
tion, examination or interview.
2. Those persons necessary for the transmission of the communication.
3. Those persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the
direction of the psychotherapist.
124. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(2)(Supp. 1976).
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Subsection 3 dictates who may claim the privilege.'25 Subsection 4
establishes three exceptions to application of the privilege.," The
policy behind the psychotherapist-patient privilege is a recognition
that in order to be effective, a psychotherapist must be able to
persuade his patient to talk freely. Consequently, the key to estab-
lishing the privilege in a particular set of facts is to show that the
communication was "made for the purpose of diagnosis or treat-
ment of his [the patient's] mental or emotional condition, includ-
ing alcoholism and other drug addiction."'"
The three exceptions to the privilege touch on controversial
issues of personal liberty: involuntary commitment of mental pa-
tients, court-ordered mental examinations, and examination of a
litigant who places his mental state in issue. By excepting applica-
tion of the privilege in these cases, the Code shifts these
controversies to another, more appropriate forum, beyond the scope
of the law of evidence.
The Sponsors' Note does an excellent job of explaining these
provisions. Therefore, no effort is made to examine all of the intrica-
cies of the privilege. The Code, it should be noted, expands on the
statutory privilege that it replaced128 and is nearly identical to the
"proposed" federal rule.12 1
125. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(3) (Supp. 1976). This subsection provides:
The privilege may be claimed by:
(a) The patient or his attorney on his behalf.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the patient.
(c) The personal representative of a deceased patient.
(d) The psychotherapist, but only on behalf of the patient. The authority of a
psychotherapist to claim the privilege is presumed in the absence of evidence to
the contrary.
126. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(Supp. 1976). This subsection provides:
There is no privilege under this section:
(a) For communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to compel hospitali-
zation of a patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of
diagnosis or treatment has reasonable cause to believe the patient is in need of
hospitalization.
(b) For communications made in the course for a court-ordered examination of
the mental or emotional condition of the patient.
(c) For communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condi-
tion of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an
element of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding
in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
127. FLA. STAT. § 90.503(2) (Supp. 1976).
128. FLA. STAT. § 90.242 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237.
129 FED. R. Ev1D., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 504 (West).
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Section 504 covers the husband-wife privilege. It establishes a
communications privilege only, in recognition of the fact that Flor-
ida has abrogated by statute the common law testimony rules which
provided that one spouse was incompetent to testify against the
other spouse, and that one spouse was privileged from being com-
pelled to testify against the other spouse.'30
The Code provides that either spouse has the privilege, during
and after coverture, for "communications which were intended to be
made in confidence between the spouses while they were husband
and wife.' 3' Subsection 2 then dictates who may claim the privi-
lege 3  and subsecton 3 lists four well-established exceptions to ap-
plication of the privilege.'33
The policy behind the privilege is to promote and encourage
mutual confidence between husband and wife and to preserve the
marital status. 3' Consequently, the privilege only attaches to com-
munications made when confidentiality could be anticipated.
The Florida approach to this privilege, both common law and
Code, is radically different from the "proposed" federal rule. 35 The
only husband-wife privilege recognized by the federal rule is the
right of an accused in a criminal trial to prevent his spouse from
130. FLA. STAT. § 90.04 (1975). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 (West Special Pamphlet
1976), Sponsors' Note. For a discussion of the difference between testimony and communica-
tions privilege, see Comment, The Marital Testimony and Communications Privileges: Im-
provements and Uncertainties In California And Federal Courts, 9 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 569
(1976).
131. FLA. STAT. § 90.504(1)(Supp. 1976).
132. FLA. STAT. § 90.504(2)(Supp. 1976). This subsection provides that "[the privilege
may be claimed by either spouse or by the guardian or conservator of a spouse. The authority
of a spouse, or guardian or conservator of a spouse, to claim the privilege is presumed in the
absence of contrary evidence."
133. FLA. STAT. § 90.504(3)(Supp. 1976). This subsection provides:
There is no privilege under this section:
(a) In a proceeding brought by or on behalf of one spouse against the other
spouse.
(b) In a criminal proceeding in which one spouse is charged with:
1. A crime committed at any time against the person or property or the other
spouse, or the person or property of a child of either; or
2. A crime committed at any time against the person or property of a third
person, which crime was committed in the course of committing a crime against
the person or property of the other spouse.
(c) In a criminal proceeding in which the communication is offered in evidence
by a defendant-spouse who is one of the spouses between whom the communica-
tion was made.
134. Brown v. May, 76 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
135. FED. R. Ev., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 505 (West).
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testifying against him, a privilege that the Florida Legislature, as
noted earlier, previously abrogated.'36 The federal rule does not rec-
ognize a privilege for confidential communications such as that pro-
vided by section 504 of the Code. The federal rule's drafters
apparently subscribed to the philosophy that married couples, in all
likelihood, are unaware of such a privilege, and consequently, that
existence of the privilege would have little or no beneficial affect on
marital conduct.'37 This reasoning is questionable. The increase in
litigation and publicity for legal matters has probably made the
public very aware of such a privilege. '38 At the very least, television
may well have given the public a general impresgion that spouses
may not be compelled to testify against one another.
The Code's approach to the husband-wife privilege appears to
be the better view. In addition, there should be no problem in appli-
cation of this privilege, since the Code provision has the salutory
effect of maintaining the prior case law.
Section 505 sets forth the privilege with respect to communica-
tions to clergymen. It mirrors the former statutory provision'3 which
it replaced. To invoke the privilege, one must establish that the
communication was "made privately for the purpose of seeking spir-
itual counsel and advice from the clergyman in the usual course of
his practice or discipline. 4 ' Such problems as who qualifies as a
clergyman and what constitutes spiritual counsel are issues that
must be resolved by interpreting the Code's language in light of
specific fact situations.
Section 506 establishes a privilege for trade secrets."' It is an
extension of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(c)(7), which per-
mits the trial judge to protect trade secrets from unlimited discov-
ery. "The purpose of the privilege is to prohibit a party from using
the duty of a witness to testify as a method of obtaining a valuable
trade secret ... .""I In attempting to claim the privilege, a lawyer
136. See n.133 supra.
137. FED. R. EVID., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 505, Advisory
Comm. Note, subdivision (a) (West).
138. See Comment, The Marital Testimony and Communications Privileges: Improve-
ments and Uncertainties in California and Federal Courts, 9 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 569, 573
(1976).
139. FLA. STAT. § 90.241 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237.
140. FLA. STAT. § 90.505(1)(b)(Supp. 1976).
141. FLA. STAT. § 90.506 (Supp. 1976). The relevant federal provision is Federal Rules of
Evidence, Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 508 (West).
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
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must be prepared to argue that the importance of protecting his
client's secret outweighs the value of such testimony to the litiga-
tion.
It should also be noted that the Code gives the trial judge dis-
cretion to order the testimony under some protective procedure.
Consequently, the trial lawyer should be prepared to suggest use of
an in camera viewing by the judge, sealing of the record or other
approaches designed to insure fairness to his client.
Since the primary purpose for most privileges is to promote
some relationship by giving it a supporting confidentiality, section
507 provides that a holder of a privilege waives his right to claim it
when he "voluntarily discloses, or consents to disclosure of, any
significant part of the matter or communication."'' This waiver
provision reflects both prior Florida law'44 and federal law.'45 It
Rhould be noted that the waiver is not dependent on knowledge of
the existence of the privilege. Once the client destroys confidential-
ity through voluntary disclosure, it does not matter if he was un-
aware of the privilege at the time of the disclosure.
The only exception to this waiver provision is provided by sec-
tion 508, which declares that a privilege is not lost where disclosure
was compelled by an erroneous ruling of the court or made without
opportunity to claim the privilege. This provision eliminates the
"hazard of being cited and punished for contempt""' for asserting
a privilege and refusing to testify.4 7
The final two sections of article 5 provide that privilege commu-
nications made prior to the effective date of the Code are not abro-
gated by article 514s and that a court may dismiss any claim or
affirmative defense when the party asserting it also asserts a privi-
lege as to a communication necessary to an adverse party.'49
VII. ARTICLE 6-WITNESSES
Article 6 determines the competency of witnesses and governs
143. FLA. STAT. § 90.507 (Supp. 1976).
144. See Savino v. Luciano, 92 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1957).
145. See FED. R. EVID., Appendix of Deleted and Superseded Materials, Rule 511, Advi-
sory Comm. Note (West).
146. Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 144 (6th Cir. 1944).
147. See Tibado v. Brees, 212 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
148. FLA. STAT. § 90.509 (Supp. 1976).
149. FLA. STAT. § 90.510 (Supp. 1976).
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the scope and mode of their interrogation. It contains some substan-
tial changes from the pre-Code Florida approach.
Section 601 establishes a general rule that "[e]very person is
competent to be a witness, except as otherwise provided by
statute." This does not alter the prior Florida law drastically be-
cause former chapter 90 of the Florida Statutes had already elimi-
nated most of the common law rules of incompetency. 15 The Code
does have the effect, however, of reversing the presumption concern-
ing competency and requires that anyone who would challenge the
competency of a witness must find a specific statutory provision to
support the challenge. Sections 602 through 607 provide the statu-
tory support for challenges to competency.
Section 602 is the "Deadman's Statute." It prohibits testimony
by an interested party concerning any oral communication between
the interested party and a decedent or incompetent in an action
against the decedent's successor in interest or the incompetent's
personal representative. Like the prior Florida Deadman's Act,' 5'
the Code's provision has two exceptions. The rule of incompetency
does not apply where the decedent's successor in interest testifies
on his own behalf about the oral communication or when the succes-
sor in interest offers some other evidence of the subject matter of
the communication.
152
Section 602 differs in one major respect from the prior act. It
applies only to oral communications between the interested party
and the decedent, whereas the prior act applied to all transactions
between the two. This provision clearly overrules cases in which the
act was held to prohibit testimony as to the non-oral aspects of a
transaction between the interested party and the deceased. 53 The
Sponsors' Note to section 602 indicates that the change to oral com-
munications was made because of problems that had arisen in
150. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.04 (1975) (originally enacted as 1874 Fla. Laws, ch. 1983)(abro-
gated the common law rule that spouses were incompetent to testify in civil actions where
the other was a party); FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975) (eliminated the rule that all persons with a
pecuniary interest in the litigation were incompetent).
151. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-273.
152. FLA. STAT. § 90.602(2) (Supp. 1976).
153. E.g., Catlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933) (holding a woman incom-
petent to testify to any facts tending to establish the existence of a marriage relation between
her and the deceased in an action to recover property owned by the deceased); Holliday v.
McKinne, 22 Fla. 153 (1886) (holding that a party may not be permitted to prove the signa-
ture of a deceased person to a bill of sale that covers the transaction). Both of the above
decisions are no longer good law.
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connection with the term transaction. The new rule does have the
salutary effect of eliminating the difficulties inherent in defining the
term transaction. However, the new rule is also indicative of a desire
to limit the application of this aspect of incompetency and perhaps
suggests that the "Deadman's Statute" should be eliminated alto-
gether.'
5'
The theory behind the rule is that the potential for fraud is
great where no testimony exists to challenge that of the interested
party. The application of the rule, however, may result in the de-
struction of a legitimate cause of action or defense. Cross-
examination and other truth-testing devices reduce the potential for
fraud. Consequently, the desire not to eliminate evidence essential
to a legitimate claim or defense should outweigh the fear of fraud
and should sanction rejection of the rule.' The Federal Rules reject
the rule, except in diversity cases where state law applies.15
Section 603 disqualifies a person who is so incapable of express-
ing himself that he can not be understood directly or through an
interpreter or a person who is incapable of understanding the duty
of a witness to tell the truth. The trial judge is to make such deter-
minations as they arise in the course of litigation. This rule codifies
the prior Florida approach.'57 It should be noted that this rule has
its primary application in cases where children are offered as wit-
nesses. 158
Section 604 prohibits a witness, other than an expert testifying
in response to a hypothetical question, from testifying on matters
of which he has no personal knowledge. Thus, prior to questioning
a witness on a particular matter, a predicate must be established
to show that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. This
154. The original draft of the Code did not contain a "Deadman's Statute." It was later
included because "there is generally no opposing testimony to meet the allegation of the
interested claimant and fraud and hardship could result if the surviving party was permitted
to testify concerning the oral communication." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.602 (West Special Pam-
phlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
155. There is a wealth of materials discussing the pros and cons of the "Deadman's
Statute." For a compilation of many of these materials, see J. MAOUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J.
CHADBOURN, & J. MANSFIELD, EVIDENCE, CASES AND MATERIALS 243-48 (6th ed. 1973).
156. FED. R. EID. 601, Advisory Comm. Note.
157. See Bell v. State, 93 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Clinton v State, 53 Fla. 98, 43 So. 312
(1907).
158. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 93 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43
So. 312 (1907).
159. See Herndon v. State, 73 Fla. 451, 74 So. 511 (1917).
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requirement reflects the common law' and the federal approach'0 0
and presents nothing new for experienced trial counsel.
Section 605 provides a flexible form of oath' and allows discre-
tion in the trial judge to determine whether a child understands the
duty to tell the truth. Section 606 establishes the requirements for
use of interpreters in the courtroom. Neither section presents any
change from pre-Code rules.
Section 607 specifically prohibits judges and jurors from serving
as witnesses. A judge is allowed to testify, however, when both par-
ties agree to the judge's giving evidence "on a purely formal matter
to facilitate the trial of the action.""'6 Under pre-Code law a judge
was competent to testify. He was bound to disqualify himself if he
were a material witness in the cause,' but the lawyer was in a
precarious position if the judge chose not to recuse himself. The
most important provision in section 607 is the one which provides
than an objection is not necessary to preserve the issue of the judge's
competency to testify.'6 ' This provision relieves the lawyer of having
to challenge the competency of the judge as a witness.
Another important provision in section 607 allows a party to
object to the calling of a juror as a witness out of the presence of
the jury. This provision relieves the lawyer of having to challenge
the competency of a juror in front of the jury, and eliminates the
potential prejudice that could flow from such an objection.
Perhaps the most intricate provision in section 607 is subsection
(2) (b): "Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment,
a juror is not competent to testify as to any matter which essentially
inheres in the verdict or indictment." The purpose for this rule is
to promote freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts,
and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment.'65
The Sponsors' Note points out that the Code rule "dis-
tinguishes between a juror's own throught processes and conduct
which might affect all the jurors and thus does not inhere in the
160. FED. R. EVID. 602.
161. The rule suggests the following form: "Do you swear or affirm that the evidence you
are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?" FLA. STAT. §
90.605 (Supp. 1976).
162. FLA. STAT. § 90.607(1)(b) (Supp. 1976).
163. FLA. STAT. § 38.02 (1975).
164. FLA. STAT. § 90.607(1)(a) (Supp. 1976).
165. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
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verdict."' 6 Where the lawyer suspects that there has been a quo-
tient verdict or some other conduct which does not appear in the
verdict, he is apparently justified under the Code in questioning the
jurors and using their testimony in challenging the validity of the
verdict.
Section 608 controls impeachment of witnesses. Sections 609
and 610 govern the use of character evidence for impeachment pur-
poses. Together these rules represent a move away from the common
law rule strictly limiting impeachment of one's own witness, but fall
short of adopting the absolutism of the federal rules" 7 which allow
impeachment of a witness by any party through any permissible
means.
Under the Code, any party, except the party calling the wit-
ness, may attack the credibility of a witness by (1) an introduction
of inconsistent statements, (2) a showing of bias, (3) an attack on
the witness' character for truthfulness, (4) a showing of a defect in
observation or memory, or (5) a proof by other witnesses that mate-
rial facts are not as the witness testified.' The party producing the
witness is never permitted to impeach the character of his witness
for truthfulness, but he may impeach by any of the other means
established by the Code if the witness proves to be adverse.
The primary difference between the Code and pre-Code law is
that the Code does not require the party to be surprised or en-
trapped by the testimony before he is allowed to attempt to impeach
his own witness.' The Code does not go as far as the Federal Rules
which allow any party to impeach the credibility of any witness.7 0
The Code still requires that the witness' testimony be adverse and
166. Federal Rule 606 takes a different approach. It distinguishes between matters that
take place inside the jury room during deliberations and matters such as extraneous prejudi-
cial information improperly brought to the jury's attention or outside influence improperly
brought to bear on any juror. Under this approach, a juror is not permitted to testify as to
the use of a quotient verdict or the misconduct of another juror during deliberations. How-
ever, the Federal Rules compensate by providing that jurors should be encouraged to
promptly report to the court any misconduct that occurs during deliberations.
It is not clear which approach is better. Does the Code approach open a floodgate for
potential harrassment of jurors? Is the federal rule acceptable in such a blatant case as a
drunken juror? These and other questions should be subject to empirical analysis and further
debate.
167. See FED. R. EvID. 607, 609(a)-(e).
168. FLA. STAT. § 90.608(1)(Supp. 1976).
169. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Cutler, 212 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968); Johnson v.
State, 178 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
170. FED. R. EvID. 607.
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prejudicial before the party calling him may attempt impeach-
ment."' Thus, if a party calls a witness expecting him to testify
favorably and the witness in fact gives testimony harmful to the
party's case, the witness may be impeached by any means other
than an attack on his character. However, if a party calls a witness
expecting him to testify favorably and the witness merely refuses to
give the favorable testimony, or gives testimony that is not harmful
to the party, he may not be impeached.'
The common law rule against impeaching one's own witness is
apparently based on two policy considerations: (1) a party who calls
a witness holds him out as worthy of belief, 173 and (2) allowing such
impeachment would permit the party to "get the benefit of those
expected facts, as substantive evidence, through the mouth of an-
other witness, under the guise of impeachment. Evidence adduced
in this manner is nothing more than the veriest hearsay, and is
inadmissible."'7 Both considerations represent archaic policy.
As was pointed out in Johnson v. State,"'
The rule that one may not impeach his own witness has its most
likely origin in trial by compurgation, or wager of law, in which
the defendant or person accused was to make oath of his own
innocence, and to produce a number of compurgators, to swear
that they believed his oath. I Blackstone 342. It is logical
enough to say that the party avouches for or guarantees 'oath-
helpers,' but there is no apparent reason for saying that he
avouches for or guarantees the credibility of his 'fact-tellers.' This
rule has, however, become so deeply embedded in the law that a
major operation will be required to remove it, and this the courts,
no doubt, will leave to the legislative bodies.
The Code has foregone the opportunity to perform this operation.
Furthermore, the second policy consideration is no longer valid be-
cause the Code provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay if the
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
171. FA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note, citing
Hernandez v. State, 156 Fla. 356, 22 So. 2d 781 (1945).
172. Adams v. State, 34 Fla. 185, 195, 15 So. 905, 908 (1894); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608
(West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note, subsection (2).
173. Johnson v. State, 178 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. 2d Dist. 165).
174. Adams v. State, 34 Fla. 185, 195, 15 So. 905, 908 (1894).
175. 178 So. 2d at 727. For discussion of the reason for rejecting the common law rule,
see FED. R. EviD. 607, Advisory Comm. Note.
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examination concerning the statement, and the statement is: (a)
[i]nconsistent with his testimony ....
The legislature, unfortunately, did not reject entirely the com-
mon law rule against impeaching one's own witness. Eliminating
the requirement of surprise, however, is at least a step in the right
direction.
Section 609 treats more specifically the use of character evi-
dence for impeachment purposes. It provides that such evidence is
permissible in the form of reputation or opinion, but that it must
be limited to the witness' character for truthfulness. Evidence in
support of a witness' character for truthfulness is admissible only
after his character has been attacked. Section 609 explains the ex-
ception to the limitation on use of character evidence set forth in
section 404.' 77 These two sections should always be considered in
conjunction with each other.
Section 609 is surprisingly silent concerning whether specific
instances of the conduct of a witness may be proved by extrinsic
evidence for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility
of the witness. Presumably, inquiries into such specific conduct may
be made on cross-examination under section 405(1), as long as they
concern his character for truthfulness only. 78 However, to allow ex-
trinsic proof of specific instances of conduct to impeach the credibil-
ity of a witness could be time consuming, confusing and potentially
very prejudicial. 7 Hopefully, the legislature will clarify this section.
In the meantime, if the lawyer is faced with an opponent attempting
to make such proof, he can argue that the judge should use his
discretion under section 403 to rule it inadmissible on grounds of
prejudice, confusion and waste of time.8s
Section 610 treats specifically the use of criminal convictions as
an impeachment tool. Such evidence is permitted only where the
crime involved dishonesty or false statement and where the crime
176. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a) (Supp. 1976).
177. See text accompanying notes 77-86 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
179. See FED. R. EvID. 608. A similar issue was presented in Statewright v. State, 278
So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), rev 'd on other grounds, 300 So. 2d 674 (1974), where the state
offered extrinsic evidence that the defendant-witness was a homosexual after the defendant
had denied it on cross-examination. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that on cross-
examination of a witness on collateral matters the answer given by the witness is conclusive,
and extrinsic evidence contradicting the witness' answer is inadmissible.
180. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
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was not "so remote in time as to have no bearing on the present
character of the witness.""' The section prohibits use of crimes for
which the witness received a pardon and also prohibits introduction
of evidence of juvenile adjudications. Evidence of the pendency of
an appeal is admissible, but it does not render evidence of the con-
viction inadmissible.
Section 610 changes pre-Code Florida law and differs from the
Federal Rules. The pre-Code Florida law allowed a witness to be
impeached "by reason of conviction of any crime."' 82 The Federal
Rules permit use of crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year or evidence of any crime involving dishonesty or
false statement.8 3 This approach is illogical since there is no reason
to believe that the commission of a certain type crime, such as a
crime of passion, is indicative of the characteristic of untruthful-
ness. The Code's approach of admitting only crimes involving dis-
honesty or false statement is more sound.
By prohibiting use of juvenile adjudications, the Code may pro-
duce serious injustice, particularly in some criminal cases. The de-
sire to protect the juvenile is salutary, but may be accomplished
without the side effect of producing serious injustices by granting
the trial judge discretion to admit evidence of such adjudications
where necessary to insure a fair trial.'
Section 611 prohibits evidence of the religious beliefs of a wit-
ness to either enhance or impair the credibility of a witness. It
comports with prior Florida law'85 and the federal rule.'8'
Section 612 gives the trial judge discretion to control the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses. 87 It also reflects the common
law' 88 and Federal Rules' by limiting the scope of cross-
181. FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1)(a)(Supp. 1976).
182. FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237.
183. FED. R. EvID. 609.
184. See FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
185. FLA. STAT. § 90.06 (1975), repealed b.y 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237.
186. FED. R. EVID. 610.
187. The judge's discretion should be exercised to:
"(a) Facilitate, through effective interrogation and presentation, the dis-
covery of the truth.
(b) Avoid needless consumption of time.
(c) Protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."
FLA. STAT. § 90.612 (Supp. 1976).
188. See Padgett v. State, 64 Fla. 389, 59 So. 946 (1912).
189. FED. R. EvID. 611(b).
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examination to the subject matter of the direct examination, except
where the court in its discretion permits inquiry into additional
matters. The Code provision does not pose any new problems for the
trial lawyer. However, the scope of the subject matter permissible
is unclear. Trial counsel will have to settle such problems on a case-
by-case basis through reference to decisional law." 0
Section 612 also contains a prohibition against the use of lead-
ing questions on direct or redirect examination. The judge has dis-
cretion to allow leading questions when the interests of justice so
require it.
Section 613 provides that when a witness uses a writing to
refresh his memory while testifying, the adverse party is entitled to
see it, cross-examine the witness about it, and introduce it into
evidence. 19 1 Both the common lawI92 and the Federal Ruleg"I have
similar provisions.
Section 613 should present no serious problems in application;
however, it is important to distinguish between writings used to
refresh the witness' memory and writings which fall under the re-
corded recollection exception to the hearsay rule.' In the case of the
former, the writings may be of any nature because they only serve
to jog the witness' memory, from which he then gives an indepen-
dent account of the occurrence. In the case of the latter, the writing
must meet certain specifications because it is introduced as evi-
dence of the occurrence. Section 613 allows writings used to refresh
memory in evidence only at the instance of the adverse party, and
only if the witness actually testifies after having used the writing to
refresh his memory.
Section 614 codifies the Florida Supreme Court decision in
190. For discusson of the decisions regarding the permissible scope of cross-examination,
see the Sponsors' Note to § 612; HICKS, supra note 24, at § 189.
191. Section 613 contains the protective features:
If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter
of his testimony, the judge shall examine the writing in camera, excise any por-
tions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled
thereto. Any portion withheld over objection shall be preserved and made avail-
able to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing or other item is
not produced or delivered pursuant to order under this section, the testimony of
the witness concerning those matters shall be stricken.
192. See Allen v. State, 243 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
193. FED. R. EVID. 612.
194. FA. STAT. § 90.803(5)(Supp. 1976); see note 253 infra.
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Smith v. State'95 and requires that prior to cross-examination con-
cerning a prior inconsistent statement, the substance of the prior
statement must be revealed to the witness. The counsel cross-
examining, however, may not be compelled to reveal private memo-
randa used to aid his memory during the trial. This section is a
modified version of the rule in The Queen's Case' and seeks to
protect against unwarranted insinuations by the cross-examiner
that a statement has been made when in fact it was not, but also
seeks to avoid invading the work product of trial counsel.'97 The
effect of the Code provision is that the cross-examiner need only
disclose the contents of the witness' prior statement, without deliv-
ering to the witness or opposing counsel his private papers.
The second half of section 614 imposes the familiar requirement
that a witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior
statement and the opposite party afforded an opportunity to inter-
rogate him on it before it can be proved by extrinsic proof. This
requirement reflects prior Florida law" 8 but differs from the Federal
Rules,' which simply provide the witness an opportunity to explain
without specifying any particular time or sequence.
The requirements of section 614 are not unduly restrictive.
They do not alter the present requirements for conducting an im-
peachment by use of prior inconsistent statements.
The final section of article 6 gives the court power to call wit-
nesses and permits the court, as well as all parties, to cross-examine
such witnesses. 20
0
It should be noted that the Code does not include a section
governing the exclusion or sequestration of witnesses. It is not clear
why no attempt was made to codify the existing law on this familiar
procedure, but its absence should certainly not be taken to indicate
any disfavor of the common law rule. Reference should be made to
195. 95 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1957).
196. 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (C.P. 1820).
197. Federal Rule 613(a) does not require that the statement be shown to the witness
prior to questioning him about it. It is questionable whether the rule of The Queen's Case
was effective in protecting against the insinuations of the cross-examiner. See Ladd, Some
Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 246-47 (1967).
198. Hancock v. McDonald, 148 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963); FLA. STAT. § 90.10
(1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237.
199. FED. R. EVID. 613.
200. FLA. STAT. § 90.615 (Supp. 1976).
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prior case law"' for support of motions to exclude or sequester wit-
nesses.
Article 6 is an extensive and fairly comprehensive statute gov-
erning competency of witnesses and the scope and mode of their
interrogation. It interacts closely with the provisions of article 4 and
presents some substantial changes from pre-Code law.
VIII. ARTICLE 7-OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Opinion testimony by lay and expert witnesses is governed by
the provisions of article 7, which presents some major changes from
the pre-Code law. Section 701 permits lay witnesses to testify in the
form of an opinion or an inference when:
(1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and
adequacy, communicate what he has perceived to the trier of fact
without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and his use
of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the
prejudice of the objecting party; and
(2) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowl-
edge, skill, experience, or training."'2
The language of the section is not particularly helpful to the
trial lawyer in determining whether a specific instance of lay opin-
ion testimony is objectionable. The best way to decide whether an
objection is warranted is probably a common sense judgment
whether the opinion given is of a type characteristic of ordinary
conversation and cannot otherwise be made intelligible. 203
Federal Rule 701, which provides a better guideline, requires
that the opinion be rationally based on the perceptions of the wit-
ness and helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony. If the
opinion offered is patently irrational in light of what the witness
perceived or could have perceived, it should be objectionable under
the Code's language as misleading and prejudicial. In any event,
cross-examination can reveal any irrationality in the opinion or in-
ference.
As the Sponsors' Note indicates, it is unclear to what extent
Florida common law allowed lay opinion testimony. Section 701
may expand somewhat the instances in which lay opinion testimony
201. See generally HICKs, supra note 24, at § 134. See also FED. R. EVID. 615.
202. FLA. STAT. § 90.701 (Supp. 1976).
203. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.701 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
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is permissible, since the legislature's intent is to insure that the trier
of fact receives a-complete rendition of the occurrence. The trial bar
and bench will find it helpful.to bear this goal in mind.
Expert opinion testimony is permitted by section 702 where it
will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evdence or in deter-
mining a fact in issue." However, it is admissible only if applicable
to evidence at trial. An expert is defined as an individual possessing
special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.204 It is
for the court to consider these factors and determine whether a
witness is qualified as an expert.
The Sponsors' Note to section 702 and the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to Federal Rule 702 both quote a test developed by Pro-
fessor Ladd 05 for determining whether expert testimony is admissi-
ble:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may
be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained
layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the
best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment
from those having a specialized understanding of the subject in-
volved in the dispute.2"
The Code reflects the approach of recent Florida cases in pro-
viding that opinion testimony admissible under sections 701 or 702
is not objectionable merely because the opinion concerns an
"ultimate" fact in issue."' The distinction between ultimate and
evidential facts is unsatisfactiry, yand its continued rejection is ap-
propriate. Rejection of such a distinction should facilitate presenta-
tion of the case to the trier of fact.
There are still important limitations on the use of opinion testi-
mony that should not be overlooked. Trial counsel should be pre-
pared to argue that an opinion offered against his side of the case is
inadmissible under section 701 because it ,is not rationally based on
the witness' perceptions or because the testimony could be put for-
ward easily without using the opinion. Furthermore, expert opinion
may be challenged under section 702 or section 403 as a waste of
204. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 1.390.
205. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VND. L. REv. 414 (1952).
206. Id. at 418.
207. FLA. STAT. § 90.703 (Supp. 1976). The leading Florida case permitting opinion
testimony on an ultimate issue is North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1953), aff'd, 346 U.S. 932
(1954). See also FFD. R. EvID. 704.
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time. Finally, an opinion is not permitted where it amounts to a
legal conclusion. The classic example is that a witness may not
testify that someone was negligent, since this is a legal conclusion."0 8
Sections 701 through 703, establishing when opinion testimony
may be used, do not radically alter pre-Code law2"1 and should pose
no problems in application. The remaining two sections in article
7, however, present major changes in the common law. Section 704
expands the sources of facts upon which an expert opinion may be
based to include data "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the subject to support the opinion expressed," whether such data
is admissible in court or not. Section 705 removes the necessity of
using hypothetical questions to elicit the opinion of an expert by
eliminating the common law requirement that facts upon which an
opinion is based must be disclosed prior to admission of the opin-
ion."'0 Under the Code, uncovering the factual basis of an opinion is
left to cross-examination.
At common law an expert could base his opinion on facts he
observed first hand or on facts presented in evidence by others at
trial. In the latter situation the witness could either sit through the
trial observing the testimony and give his opinion on that basis, or
he could testify in response to a hypothetical question which had to
be constructed on the basis of evidence presented prior to the ex-
pert's testimony.2
The Code follows the approach of the Federal Rules by allowing
experts to rely on data which experts in the subject area normally
rely upon. This approach recognizes that if experts make critical
decisions daily based on certain data, data of the same type ought
to suffice as a basis for expert testimony in a court of law."' How-
ever, there is potential for abuse in this rule since experts under the
stress of certain situations may be required to make decisions based
208. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Shouse, 83 Fla. 156, 91 So. 90 (1922).
209. See generally HICKS, supra Note 24, §§ 304-334.
210 See Alls v. State, 104 Fla. 373, 139 So. 789 (1932); Fekany v. State Road Dep't, 115
So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
211. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 14 (2d ed. 1972).
212. FED. R. EVID. 703.
213. For example, a physician makes life and death decisions based on statements by
patients and relatives, on reports and opinions of nurses, technicians and other doctors, and
on hospital records. Some of these may not be admissible, and it would be expensive and time




on unreliable data. This type of data should not be permitted to
serve as the basis of an expert's opinion in court. Opposing counsel
and the trial judge should be careful to insure that such data be of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Opposing
counsel should also be well prepared to cross-examine experts rely-
ing on such data to expose opinions that have no reliable basis in
fact.
By eliminating the requirement that facts upon which an ex-
pert opinion is based must be digclosed prior to presentation of his
opinion, the Code accepts the vast amount of literature criticizing
the hypothetical question as confusing, misleading, and a tool of
abuse in the hands of a skilled trial counsel."' However justified this
conclusion may be, there is some danger in allowing expert opinion
without disclosure of any underlying facts. Opposing counsel may
have undue difficulty in cross-examining an experienced prostitute
expert without some indication of the basis of that expert's opinion.
The Code improves on the Federal Rules"' in this respect by giving
the trial judge discretion to compel prior disclosure."l' In addition,
section 705 (2) provides:
Prior to the witness giving his opinion, a party against whom the
opinion or inference is offered may conduct a voir dire examina-
tion of the witness directed to the underlying facts or data for his
opinion. If the party establishes prima facie evidence that the
expert does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion, the opin-
ions and inferences of the expert are inadmissible unless the party
offering the testimony establishes the underlying facts or data.
Trial counsel should not hestitate to use this voir dire procedure
where he has reason to doubt whether the expert has a sufficient
basis for his opinion.
The Code should not be interpreted as prohibiting the use of a
hypothetical question where it will be the most effective method of
presenting the expert's opinion.2"' In many instances the impact of
expert opinion may not be as strong as possible unless the underly-
ing facts are revealed so that the trier of fact can follow the expert's
reasoning process. Consequently, the Code's changes may not be as
major as they appear.
214. See, e.g., 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940).
215. FED. R. EVID. 705.
216. FLA. STAT. § 90.705(1) (Supp. 1976).
217. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.705 (West Special Pamphelt 1976), Sponsors' Note.
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Conspicuous in its absence from the Code is a provision, similar
to Federal Rule 706, for court-appointed experts. This absence is a
controversial issue upon which a diversity of opinion exists. Some
commentators argue that court-appointed experts tend to acquire
an aura of infallibility to which they are not entitled.1 8 Others sug-
gest that the fear of a court-appointed expert will exert a sobering
effect on the expert witness of a party, thereby cutting back on the
availability of prostitute experts."' In view of the fact that the trial
judge may have inherent power to appoint an expert of his own
choosing,2 0 it may not be too significant that the Code does not
stautorily provide for such appointments.
IX. ARTICLE 8-HEAPSAY
An adequate treatment of the law of hearsay and the effect the
Code has on it are beyond the scope of this article. No effort will be
made to analyze each section and subsection of article 8. Rather, an
attempt will be made to give a general picture of the Code's ap-
proach to the hearsay problem and to highlight some of its more
significant differences from the common law and the Federal Rules.
Article 8 is identical in format to article 8 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Section 801(1) defines "statement," "declarant," and
"hearsay." Section 802 provides that hearsay is inadmissible, ex-
cept as provided by statute. The statutory exceptions are provided
in sections 803 and 804. The exceptions provided in section 803 do
not depend on the availability of the declarant to testify at trial.
Those provided by section 804 are only permissible when the declar-
ant is not available to testify as a witness at trial. Sections 805 and
806 complete the treatment of hearsay. Section 805 provides that
hearsay included within hearsay is admissible if an exception is
found for each of the hearsay statements. Section 806 allows attacks
on the credibility of the declarant even though he is not present in
the court room.
The Code's basic approach does not differ radically from the
common law approach to hearsay. There are certain Code sections,
218. Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony - Revisited, 34 TEMPLE L.Q. 416, 424 (1961).
This aura of infallibility can become particularly unfair in the classical "battle of the experts"
situation.
219. See FED. R. EVID. 706, Advisory Comm. Note.
220. See 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 563, 2484 (3d ed. 1940); Sink, The Unused Power
of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 195 (1956).
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however, which may prove troublesome in applicaction. These sec-
tions will be discussed in depth.
The starting point for all hearsay problems is the basic proposi-
tion that hearsay evidence is inadmissible, except as provided by
statute."' Hearsay evidence, generally, is excluded because the de-
clarant of the hearsay evidence is not subjected to the truth-testing
techniques which the Anglo-American judicial system has devised
as the basis for dispute resolution by trial. These truth-testing tech-
niques include testifying under oath, being subject to the penalty
for perjury, testifying before the trier of fact to permit observation
of the witness' demeanor, and most important, subjecting the wit-
ness to cross-examination by the adverse party.22
The first and perhaps most difficult problem for trial counsel
is determining whether a witness' testimony constitutes hearsay.
Section 801 defines what hearsay is, and is, therefore, probably the
single most important section of the Code to know and understand.
The Code defines hearsay as "an out-of-court statement, other than
one made by a declarant who testifies at the trial or hearing, offered
in court to prove the truth of the matter contained in the state-
ment." 3 There are two critical elements of this definition: what
constitutes a "statement" and what constitutes an offering "in court
to prove the truth of the matter contained in the statement."
The Code defines a "statement" as: "1. An oral or written asser-
tion; or 2. Nonverbal conduct of a person if it is intended by him as
an assertion."2 4 The oral or written assertion poses no difficulty.
Certain nonverbal conduct also poses no difficulty. For example,
both the Sponsors' Note to section 801 and the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to Federal Rule 801 describe the act of pointing to iden-
tify a suspect in a lineup as nonverbal conduct clearly assertive in
nature. Some nonverbal conduct, however, may be offered as evi-
dence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the
fact sought to be proved. The classic example of this situation in-
volves a case where it is critical to establish that a person had good
eyesight at a particular time. Evidence is offered that while the
individual was working on a ship, the captain gave him the job of
221. FLA. STAT. § 90.802 (Supp. 1976).
222. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (2d ed. 1972).
223. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (Supp. 1976). This definition is the same as the common
law of Florida. See Lombardo v. Flaming Fountain, Inc., 327 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
224. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(a) (Supp. 1976).
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lookout. The action of the captain is thought to infer that the indi-
vidual had good eyesight. At common law such evidence was inad-
missible hearsay because the captain's action was deemed to be an
"implied assertion. '25
The Code adopts the approach of the Federal Rules in rejecting
the common law rule governing implied assertions. 26 The Sponsors'
Note to section 801(1)(a) quotes the following from the Advisory
Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801:
Admittedly evidence of this character is untested with respect to
the perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of
the actor, but the Advisory Committee is of the view that these
dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent to assert and do
not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class
of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication, but the likeli-
hood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct.
The situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as
virtually to eliminate questions of sincerity. Motivation, the na-
ture of the conduct, and the presence or absence of reliance will
bear heavily upon the weight to be given the evidence ....
Although not quoted in the Sponsors' Note, the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Federal Rule 801 continues:
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it is
not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a preliminary determi-
nation will be required to determine whether an assertion is in-
tended. The rule is so worded as to place the burden upon a party
claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful
cases will be resolved against him and in favor of admissibility.
(citations omitted)
It would appear that under the Code, nonverbal conduct is only
a "statement" when the person who engaged in it intended it as an
assertion. Furthermore, the burden is on the party seeking to ex-
clude evidence of conduct to establish that it was intended as an
assertion.
The second critical element in the Code's definition of hearsay
is that the statement be "offered in court to prove the truth of the
matter contained in the statement." This element reflects the com-
225. See generally Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REv. 682 (1962); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 214-17 (1948).
226. FED. R. EvID. 801(a), Advisory Comm. Note.
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mon law's exclusion from hearsay treatment of "verbal acts," '27
statements whose significance lies solely in the fact that they were
made, and not in their truthfulness."
Simply because evidence consists of an out-of-court
"statement" "offered in court to prove the truth of the matter con-
tained in the statement" does not necessarily mean that it falls
within the Code's definition of hearsay. First, if the out-of-court
statement were made by a declarant who is present in court and
testifies, his out-of-court statement is not hearsay and may be of-
fered to prove his truthfulness."'
More specifically, subsection 2 of section 801 excludes from the
definition of hearsay certain statements which would otherwise be
hearsay. If a witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-
examination, any out-of-court statement of his which is "(a) Incon-
sistent with his testimony; (b) Consistent with his testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of impro-
per influence, motive, or recent fabrication; or (c) one of identifica-
tion of a person made after perceiving him," is not hearsay."' This
provision differs considerably from pre-Code Florida law, which
generally held that such statements were hearsay and could not be
used as substantive evidence to prove the truth of their contents . 31
The Code's definition of hearsay is a considerable improvement
over pre-Code law. Subsection 2 of section 801 recognizes the inef-
fectiveness of instructions to the jury that they may consider certain
statements only as they reflect on the credibility of a witness and
not as substantive evidence. It also recognizes that no evidence is
perfect; but as long as the delcarant is in court testifying and subject
to cross-examination, the dangers which lead to the prohibition of
hearsay in the first place are not present. As a result, such state-
ments are excluded from the definition of hearsay. For trial counsel,
the most significant part of this change is that prior inconsistent
statements may not be used as substantive evidence and need not
be limited to use for impeachment only.
The Code's definition of hearsay is very similar to Federal Rule
227. See Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578, 591 (Fla. 1958).
228. See generally, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249 (2d ed. 1972); 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§§ 1766, 1770 (Chadbourne rev. 1976).
229. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801(1)(c) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
230. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2) (Supp. 1976).
231. See FA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801(2) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
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801, with a few notable exceptions. First, the Federal Rules require
that prior inconsistent statements must have been made under oath
before they are admissible as substantive evidence.232 This require-
ment does not appear to be too important as long as the declarant
appears before the trier of fact and submits to cross-examination.
Second, the Federal Rules do not exclude identifications from the
definition of hearsay. Finally, under the Federal Rules, admissions
by a party-opponent are excluded from the definition of hearsay on
the theory that no guarantee of trustworthiness is necessary in the
case of such admissions.233 Under the Code, admissions are treated
as an exception to the hearsay rule.3 Whether this difference in
treatment has any practical significance is not clear; however, coun-
sel who practice in both federal and state court should be aware of
it.
Once it is determined that evidence is hearsay, analysis shifts
to sections 803 and 804 to ascertain whether the evidence is admissi-
ble under one of the statutory exceptions. The majority of these
exceptions are well known to experienced trial counsel, and do not
differ from pre-Code law or the Federal Rules. These exceptions will
not be discussed in this article. However, several of these statutory
exceptions represent major changes in Florida law and will be ana-
lyzed in some depth.
The most significant change the Code makes in regard to hear-
say exceptions is that it replaces the res gestae exception with two
statutory exceptions: (1) spontaneous statement,"' and (2) excited
utterance.2 36 As the Sponsors' Note indicates, rejection of the term
res gestae is long overdue. It was an ambiguous, imprecise "catch-
all" term which was often used to justify an unjustifiable ruling on
the admissibility of evidence.
The spontaneous statement exception is defined as: "[a] spon-
taneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter, except when such statement is made under
circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness."' 7 The
232. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
233. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2), Advisory Comm. Note.
234. FA. STAT. § 90.803(18) (Supp. 1976).
235. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(l) (Supp. 1976).
236. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (Supp. 1976.)
237. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(l) (Supp. 1976).
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theory underlying this exception is that the contemporaneity of the
event and the statement negate the likelihood of conscious misre-
presentation.3'
The excited utterance exception is defined as: "[a] statement
or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition." 3 ' The theory behind this exception is that the
excitement of the event temporarily eliminates the capacity of re-
flection and consequently reduces the chances of conscious misre-
presentation.240
The theories underlying these exceptions demonstrate that tim-
ing is the essence of both exceptions. As a result, they overlap to
some extent. There are two differences, however, which provide keys
not only for distinguishing between the two exceptions, but also for
deciding whether either exception applies to a particular statement.
First, the time requirement with respect to the spontaneous
statement exception is that the statement must have been made in
substantial contemporaneity with the event being described. On the
other hand, if a statement is to be admissible under the excited
utterance exception, it must have been made during the duration
of the state of excitement. For example, if a witness to an accident
goes into shock and five days later comes out of shock screaming
that the Cadillac ran the red light, his statement is not subject to
the spontaneous statement exception because it was not made in
substantial contemporaneity with the accident. However, it might
fall within the excited utterance exception because the state of ex-
citement lasted through the period of shock.
Second, the permissible subject matter differs between the two
exceptions. To qualify for the spontaneous statement exception, the
statement must be limited to a description or explanation of the
event. Anything more than a mere description would possess greater
potential for conscious misrepresentation. To qualify for the excited
utterance exception, a statement need only relate to the event which
caused the excitement since it is the state of excitement which
guards against conscious misrepresentation."'
238. See E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE. 340-41 (1962).
239. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (Supp. 1976).
240. See 6 WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 1747 (Chadbourne rev. 1976).
241. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.803(1), (2) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors'
Note.
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The effect of the Code's elimination of the res gestae exception
is that trial counsel will have to be more specific in establishing
exceptions previously based on this vague term. Consequently,
counsel is well advised to become familiar with the spontaneous
statement and excited utterance exceptions.
Section 803(3) codifies prior case law and miriors the Federal
Rules' exception for then existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition. The exception is defined as:
(a) A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
emotion, or physical sensation, including a statement of intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health, when
such evidence is offered to:
1. Prove the declarant's state of mind, emotion, or physical sen-
sation at that time or at any other time when such state is an
issue in the action.
2. Prove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant.
(b) However, this subsection does not make admissible:
1. An after-the-fact statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed, unless such statement relates to the
execution, revocation, indentification, or terms of the declarant's
will.
2. A statement made under circumstances that indicate its lack
of trustworthiness.
Such statements are generally offered to prove that the declar-
ant did the acts which he intended to do.24 The most important
aspect of this exception is that it does not apply to an after-the-fact
statement of memory to belief, except in regard to a will. This
section is not a new requirement.
The Code recognizes the common law exception for statements
by a person seeking medical diagnosis or treatment."' The theory
242. The landmark case establishing this exception is Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon,
145 U.S. 285 (1892). In Hilimon, The Supreme Court admitted the statement of a deceased
declarant that he intended to go from one city to another on a certain date to infer that the
deceased was killed during the trip. As a result the beneficiary of an insurance policy on the
deceased's life could recover the proceeds. See also Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay
Rule, 1 U. CHI. L. REV., 394 (1934); Maguire, The Hilimon Case-Thirty-Three Years After,
38 HARV. L. REV. 709 (1925).
243. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (Supp. 1976). This subsection provides:
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. - Statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment by a person seeking the diagnosis
or treatment, or made by an individual who has knowledge of the facts and is
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behind the exception is that there is a strong motivation to tell the
truth since the declarant'g treatment depends on his statements to
the physician. Consequently, the key to determining whether a par-
ticular statement made to a physician falls within the exception is
whether it was "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."2 "
For example, a statement to the doctor by the patient that he was
struck by an automobile would be admissible; however, a statement
that the automobile had run through a stop sign would not.
The Code also resolves an apparent conflict in Florida case law
as to whether statements made to a physician who is consulted
solely for the purpose of qualifying him to testify are within this
exception to the hearsay rule. 45 The Code follows the approach of
the Federal Rules in admitting such statements as substantive evi-
dence under this exception.248 The Code approach represents a con-
siderable liberalization of the exception.
The Code's business records exception provision"7 differs from
pre-Code law"' in one respect-records containing opinions are
admissible if such opinions would be admissible under article 7,49
and if the person whose opinion is recorded were to testify to the
legally responsible for the person who is unable to communicate the facts, which
statements describe medical history, past or present symptoms, pain, or sensa-
tions, or the inceptions or general character of the cause or external source thereof,
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 292 (2d ed. 1972).
244. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (Supp. 1976).
245. Compare Bondy v. West, 219 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) with Raydel, Ltd. v.
Medcalfe, 162 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
246. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(4) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note; FED.
R. EviD. 803(4), Advisory Comm. Note.
247. FLA. STAT.+4 § 90.803(6) (SupP. 1976). THIS SUBSECTION PROVIDES:
Records of regularly conducted business activity.- (a) A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinion, or
diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with a knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity to make such memorandum report, record, or data compilation, all as
shown by the tesimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness. The
term "business" as used in this paragraph includes a business, institution, asso-
ciation, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit.(b) No eviience in the form of an opinion or diagnosis is admissi-
ble under paragraph (a) unless such opinion or diagnosis would be admissible
under §§ 90.701-90.705 if the person whose opinion is recorded were to testify to
the opinion directly.
248. FLA. STAT. §§ 92.36, .37 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237.
249. See section VIR supra.
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opinion directly.25 Otherwise, the Code's business records exception
is the same as the pre-Code law and Federal Rules. It is based on
the theory that business records possess reliability stemming from
"systematic checking, regularity and continuity which produce hab-
its of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon
them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continu-
ing job or occupation. 2 '
There are three keys to determining the applicability of this
exception. First, the records must be identified by the custodian or
some other qualified witness. Second, the motivation of the inform-
ant must have been business accuracy. 2 In other words, the sources
of information for the records must be trustworthy. Third, all of the
participants in the recording process must be acting routinely. They
must all be under. a business duty to report truthfully the informa-
tion they possess. If these three conditions are met, business records
should qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The remaining exceptions in section 803 basically restate pre-
Code law.253 They will not be discussed in this article; however, trial
250. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(6) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
251. FED. R. EvID. 803(6), Advisory Comm. Note; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(6) (West
Special Pamphlet), Sponsors' Note.
252. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). Palmer and its commentators raise
the difficult issue of the motivation behind filing accident reports, particularly in the railroad
industry. An in-depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. The Code
follows the lead of the Federal Rules, avoiding this problem by dictating that such records
made in the course of regularly conducted activity will be taken as admissible, subject to
authority to exclusion if "the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of
trustworthiness." See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(6) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Spon-
sors' Note.
253.FLA. STAT. § 90.803 (Supp. 1976). These exceptions are:
(5) Recorded recollection. - A memorandum or record offered by an adverse
party concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge, but now
has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown
to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in his
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. A party may read into evidence
a memorandum or record when it is admitted, but no such memorandum or
record is admissible as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(7) Absence of entry in records of regularly conducted activity. - Evidence that
a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations,
in any form, of a regularly conducted activity to prove the nonoccurrence or
nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum,
report, records, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the
sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. - Records, reports, statements reduced to writing,
or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, or setting forth
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the activities of the office or agency, or matters observed pursuant to duty im-
posed by law as matters which there was a duty to report, excluding in criminal
cases matters observed by a police officer or other law enforcement personnel,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances show their lack of trus-
tworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. - Records or data compilations, in any form, of
births, fetal deaths, deaths or marriages, if a report was made to a public office
pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. - Evidence, in the form of a certification
in accord with § 90.902, or in the form of testimony, that diligent search failed to
disclose a record, report, statement, or data compilation or entry, when offered
to prove the absence of the record, report, statement, or data compilation would
regularly have been made and preserved by a public office and agency.
(11) Records of religious organizations. - Statements of births, marriages, di-
vorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other
similar facts of personal or family history contained in a regularly kept record of
a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. - Statements of acts con-
tained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or
administered a sacrament, when such statement was certified by a clergyman,
public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious
organization or by law to perform the act certified; and when such certificate
purports to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time
threafter.
(13) Family records. - Statements of facts concerning personal or family history
in family Bibles, charts, engravings in rings, inscriptions on family portraits,
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. - The record of a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the
contents of the original recorded or filed document and its execution and delivery
by each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record
of a public office and an applicable statute authorized the recording or filing of
the document in the office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. - A statement
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property,
if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings
with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the
truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. - Statements in a document in existence
20 years or more, the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. - Market quotations, tabula-
tions, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied
upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
(18) Admissions. - A statement that is offered against a party and is:
(a) His own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity;
(b) A statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth;
(c) A statement by a person specifically authorized by him to make a statement
concerning the subject;
(d) A statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope
of the agency or employment thereof, made during the existence of the relation-
ship; or
(e) A statement by a person who was a co-conspirator of the party during the
course, and in furtherance, of the conspiracy. Upon request of counsel, the court
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counsel should be aware of their existence and recall that they do
not depend upon the unavailability of the declarant.
Before leaving the section 803 exceptions it should be noted
that the section does not include two significant exceptions which
appear in Federal Rule 803. First, the Code does not include an
exception for learned treatises. 25' This omission means that under
the Code, treatises are admissible solely for the purposes of cross-
examination of experts, not as substantive evidence. 5
Second, Federal Rule 803(24) provides:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by
any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
shall instruct the jury that the conspiracy itself and each member's participation
in it must be established by independent nonhearsay evidence, either before the
introduction of any evidence or before evidence is admitted under this paragraph.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. - [Evidence of] reputa-
tion:
(a) Among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage;
(b) Among his associates; or
(c) In the community,
concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, rela-
tionship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his
personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history.-
[Evidence of] reputation:
(a) In a community, arising before the controversy about the boundaries of, or
customs affecting lands in, the community.
(b) About events of general history which are important to the community,
state, or nation where located.
(21) Reputation as to character. - [Evidence of] reputation of a person's char-
acter among his associates or in the community.
(22) Former testimony. - Former testimony given by the declarant at a civil
trial, when used in substantially the same civil proceeding. (citations omitted).
254. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
255. For a good discussion of the merits of this exception, see the Advisory Committee's
Notes to Federal Rule 803(18).
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prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
This provision, permitting evolution of new hearsay exceptions
through the exercise of judicial discretion, has no counterpart in the
Code. As a result, all hearsay exceptions are now and forever legisla-
tive matters. In light of the fact that the existing exceptions were
established through years of arduous judicial experience, it seems
doubtful that all possible exceptions have been developed and codi-
fied. The legislature cannot respond quickly enough with appropri-
ate new exceptions to produce justice to the litigants in those con-
troversies which provide the impetus for new exceptions. The legis-
lature, therefore, may wish to include a provision permitting judi-
cial discretion to establish new hearsay exceptions as justice de-
mands.
The underlying rationale of section 803 is that a hearsay state-
ment falling within one of the section's exceptions possesses certain
qualities to insure against the dangers of fabrication and impreci-
sion which the hearsay rule seeks to avoid. These qualities are
thought to justify the evidence's admission whether the declarant
is available at trial or not.
The policy behind the section 804 exceptions is different. The
section's theoretical basis is that while testimony of the declarant
at trial is preferred over hearsay, use of the hearsay is preferred over
complete loss of evidence when the declarant is unavailable to tes-
tify at trial.25 Consequently, the section 804 exceptions may only be
used when the declarant is unavailable to appear at the trial.
Section 804(1) defines unavailability as follows:
"Unavailability as a witness" means that the declarant:
(a) Is exempted by a ruling of a court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement;
(b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter
of his statement despite an order of the court to do so;
(c) Has suffered a lack of memory of the subject matter of his
statement so as to destroy his effectiveness as a witness during
the trial;
(d) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because
of death or because of then existing physical or mental illness or
infirmity; or
256. FED. R. EVID. 804(b), Advisory Comm. Note.
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(e) Is absent from the hearing, and the proponent of his state-
ment has been unable to procure his attendanc6 or testmony by
process or other reasonable means.
However, a declarant is not unavailable as a witness if such ex-
emption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability to be present,
or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the party
who is the proponent of his statement in preventing the witness
from attending or testifying.
This section represents a major change from the common law, which
had developed different requirements of unavailability for different
hearsay exceptions." 7 For example, a statement under belief of im-
pending death qualified for an exception to the hearsay rule only
where the declarant actually died."'8 Under the Code, the question
of unavailability is treated uniformly. If a declarant is unavailable
for any of the reasons listed in section 804(1), then all four of the
exceptions listed in 804(2) can be used to support admission of the
declarant's statement.
The first exception in section 804 is for former testimony. 59 This
section of the Code replaces former section 92.22 of Florida Statutes
and changes somewhat the requirements for establishing the excep-
tion. The prior law admitted former testimony of a witness provided
(1) such evidence has at such former trial been reported steno-
graphically or reduced to writing in the presence of the court;
(2) that the party against whom the evidence is offered, or his
privy, was a party on the former trial;
(3) that the issue is substantially the same in both cases;
(4) that a substantial reason is shown why the original witness
or document is not produced; and
(5) that the court is satisfied that the report of such evidence
taken at such formal trial is a correct report."'
257. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 255, 280, 322 (2d ed. 1972).
258. Id. § 282.
259. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(a) (Supp. 1976). this subsection provides:
Hearsay exceptions. -The following are not excluded under §90.802, provided that
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(a) Former testimony. - Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law
in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct cross, or re-direct examination.
260. FA. STAT. § 92.22 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237, § 2.
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Section 804(2)(a) does not contain specific provisions such as
those in subsections (1) and (5) of former section 92.22, but they can
fairly be implied. The Code clarifies section 92.22 by requiring that
the party against whom the former testimony is offered must have
been a party in the first proceeding or, in civil cases only, a successor
in interest to a party in the first proceeding. 6 '
The Code does not require, as did section 92.22(3), that the
issue be substantially the same in both cases. Rather, the Code
requires only that the party against whom the testimony is offered
"had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony
by direct, cross, or re-direct examination." '
The Code makes availability of the former testimony exception
dependent primarily upon whether the party against whom the evi-
dence is offered had an opportunity and similar motive in cross-
examining the witness during the first proceeding.6 3 This opportun-
ity and motive is the primary issue which trial counsel should be
prepared to argue when confronted with an attempt to admit former
testimony of a witness who is unavailable at the second trial.
The second exception in section 804 is for statements made
under belief of impending death."4 At common law such statements
were known as dying declarations, and in Florida they were only
admissible in criminal cases.6 5 The Code expands the exception,
261. When former testimony is used in criminal cases, the Code makes it clear that the
party against whom it is offered must himself have been a party in the first proceeding. This
requirement is apparently to insure against any possible violation of the defendants's right
to confrontation.
The use of former testimony which was given during a defendant's preliminary hearing
does note violate the defendant's right to confrontation. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970).
Florida recognized the former testimony exception in criminal cases in Richardson v.
State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971).
262. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(a) (Supp. 1976).
263. The code does not, however, go as far as some commentators have suggested in
relying solely on the availability of cross-examination. Professor Wigmore did not believe it
was necessary that the party against whom the evidence is offered be the one who conducted
the cross-examination in the first proceeding, as long as the party in the first proceeding had
the same interest and motive in his cros-examination. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1388 (3d
ed. 1972).
264. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(b) (Supp. 1976). This subsection provides: "Statement under
belief of impending death. - In a civil or criminal trial, a statement made by a declarant while
reasonably believing that his death was imminent, concerning the physical cause or instru-
mentalities of what he believed to be his impending death or the circumstances surrounding
his impending death."
265. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(b) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
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making it applicable in civil cases as well."'
The Code retains the common law requirement that only state-
ments "concerning the physical cause or instrumentalities of what
the declarant believed to be his impending death""2 7 are admissible.
This requirement is consistent with the theory behind the excep-
tion, which is that the religious or psychological impact of impend-
ing death will reduce the potential for conscious misrepresentation
concerning the cause of the impending death.26
The most important effect of the Code on the dying declaration
exception is to make it available in civil cases where appropriate.
The third exception in section 804 is for statements against
interest."9 Statements by an unavailable witness against his inter-
est must be distinguished from admissions of a party-opponent in a
dispute. Statements against interest are made by non-parties to a
dispute and must be against the declarant's interest as defined by
the Code. In addition, the declarant must be unavailable at trial.
An admission can be any statement of a party-opponent.
The most controversial issue presented by the Code in its for-
mulation of this exception is that a statement made against the
declarant's penal interest cannot qualify for the exception "unless
corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the state-
ment." O This provision was apparently an attempt to avoid the
possibility of violating the United States Supreme Court decision in
Chambers v. Mississippi,21' without completely adopting statements
266. See also FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(2).
267. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(b) (Supp. 1976).
268. See 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1443 (3d ed. 1972); The King v. Woodcock, 168 Eng.
Rep. 352, 353 (K.B. 1789).
269. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (Supp. 1976). This subsection provides:
Statement against interest. - A statement which, at the time of its making, was
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended to
subject him to liability or to render invalid a claim by him against another, so
that a person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible, unless
corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement. A state-
ment or confession which is offered against the accused in a criminal action, and
which is made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the
accused, is not within this exception.
270. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (Supp. 1976). See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
271. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers the Court held that the combination of the
Mississippi rule denying statements against penal interest status as hearsay exceptions,
coupled with the prohibition against impeaching one's own witness, violated due process.
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against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule.
After the Code was enacted, however, the Florida Supreme
Court, in Baker v. State, 272 adopted statements against penal inter-
est as an exception with no mention of a requirement of corroborat-
ing circumstances. The court did not appear to base its decision on
constitutional grounds; therefore, it is unclear what will result from
the present conflict between case law and the Code. Hopefully, the
legislature will redraft this section to include penal interest in the
statement against interest exception.
The final exception provided by section 804 is for statements
of personal or family history.273 More commonly known as the pedi-
gree exception, it should present nothing new.
Once hearsay evidence is found admissible under some excep-
tion in sections 803 or 804, the party against whom it is admitted
has one last important opportunity. Under section 806, this party
can attack the credibility of the declarantY' Furthermore, incon-
sistent statements or conduct may be used for impeachment,
"regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an
opportunity to deny or explain it," as section 90.614 otherwise re-
quiresY5 Industrious counsel can use this provision to attempt to
blunt the impact of not being able to cross-examine the declarant.
The Code's treatment of hearsay is fairly understandable and
comprehensive. In highlighting some of the Code's article 8 provi-
sions this article has examined only a small number of the multi-
tude of issues that will surely arise as the hearsay provisions of the
Code are put into practice.
X. ARTICLE 9-AUTHENTICITY AND THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE
The final article of the Code concerns two separate problems in
the law of evidence. Sections 901 through 903 essentially restate the
pre-Code requirement tht evidence be authenticated or identified as
272. 336 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1976).
273. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(d) (Supp. 1976). This subsection provides: "Statement of
personal or family history. - A statement concerning the declarant's own birth, adoption,
marriage, divorce, legitimacy, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history,
including relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, even though the declarant had no
means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated."
274. When the credibility of the declarant is attacked, his credibility "may be supported
by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as
a witness." FLA. STAT. § 90.806(1) (Supp. 1976).
275. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.806(1) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
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a logical step in establishing its relevance and admissibility.", Sec-
tions 951 through 958 clarify and liberalize the Florida best evidence
rule . "
Article 9's treatment of the requirement of authenticity is con-
ceptually and mechanically straightforward and should pose no
problems in application. Section 901 states the general rule, requir-
ing that any corporeal object of evidence be authenticated or identi-
fied as a condition precedent to its admissibility. This requirement
is a question of conditional relevancy for the judge to determine
prior to ruling on the admissibility of the evidence."' Satisfaction
of this requirement does not insure that the evidence will ultimately
be held authentic. The ultimate determination will be made by the
trier of fact.
Section 901 provides that "[t]he requirements of this section
are satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims." The Sponsors'
Note to section 901 gives nine examples of methods which Florida
courts have approved for authenticating a piece of evidence.27 These
examples should not be taken as an exhaustive list. Inventive coun-
sel may develop new methods if the 'ones in existence do not meet
the needs at hand. However, the Sponsors' Note to section 901
should be a helpful starting point for the trial lawyer with evidence
which he desires to authenticate for admission at trial.
Certain kinds of evidence are held to satisfy the requirement of
secton 901 without extrinsic evidence of authenticity."' Of course,
276. See, e.g., DeLong v. Williams, 232 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). For a dicussion
of authentication as an element of relevancy, see McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 218 (2d ed. 1972);
Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4
GA. L. REV. 43 (1969).
277. See text accompanying notes 279-88 infra.
278. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
279. See also FED. R. EVID. 901(b).
280. FLA. STAT. § 90.902 (Supp. 1976). These self-authenticated documents are:
(1) A document bearing:
(a) A seal purporting to be that of the United States or any state, district,
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof; the Panama Canal Zone;
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; or a court, political subdivision, depart-
ment, officer, or agency of any of them; and
(b) A signature by the custodian of the document attesting to the authenticity
of the seal.
(2) A document not bearing a seal [but) purporting to bear a signature of an




the opponent can still challenge the authenticity of such evidence.
Trial counsel, however, should always check this list to insure that
his evidence at least gets before the jury.
Section 903 provides that "testimony of a subscribing witness
is not necessary to authenticate a writing unless the statute requir-
ing attestation requires it." The most notable statutory exception
to section 903 is the requirement that a witness to a will be produced
at trial to attest to the signing of the will if he is available. 81 The
section itself merely restates the pre-Code law. 82
The Code's treatment of the best evidence rule is not compli-
cated but does represent a liberalization of the pre-Code Florida
law. Existing case law provides that when attempting to prove the
(3) An official foreign document, record, or entry that is:
(a) Executed or attested to by a person in his official capacity authorized by the
laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation; and
(b) Accompanied by a final certification, as provided herein, of the genuineness
of the signature and official position of:
1. The executing person; or
2. Any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official
position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of
genuineness of signature and official position relating to the execution or attesta-
tion. The final certification may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States or a
diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the
United States. When the parties receive reasonable opportunity to investigate the
authenticity and accuracy of official foreign documents, the court may order that
they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certificate or permit
them in evidence by an attested summary with or without final certification.
(4) A copy of an official public record, report, or entry, or of a document author-
ized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office,
including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or
other person authorized to make the certification by certificate complying with
subsections (1), (2), or (3) or complying with any act of the Legislature or rule
adopted by the Supreme Court.
(5) Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued by a govern-
mental authority.
(6) Printed materials purporting to be newspapers or periodicals.
(7) Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the
course of business and indicating ownership, control, or origin.
(8) Commercial papers and signatures thereon and documents relating to them,
to the extent provided in the Uniform Commercial Code.
(9) Any signature, document, or other matter declared by the Legislature to be
presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.
(10) Any document properly certified under the law of the jurisdiction where the
certification is made. (citation omitted).
281. FLA. STAT. § 733.201 (1975).
282. Windle v. Sibold, 241 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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contents of a writing, recording or photograph, duplicates can only
be used when the original is unavailable."' Section 953 of the Code
now provides to the contrary:
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original, un-
less:
(1) The document or writing is a negotiable instrument as de-
fined in § 673.104, a security as defined in § 678.102, or any other
writing that evidences a right to the payment of money, is not
itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that is trans-
ferred by delivery in the ordinary course of business with any
necessary endorsement or assignment.
(2) A genuine question is raised about the authenticity of the
original or any other document or writing.
(3) It is unfair, under the circumstances, to admit the duplicate
in lieu of the original.
The time and expense that should be saved as a result of this new
rule ought to be considerable.
Section 951 defines "writings and recordings," ' 4 "photo-
graphs,"2 "original,".28  and most importantly "duplicate.''27 Some
dispute will likely arise over what constitutes a duplicate since
the effect of finding a duplicate is probable admissibility under
section 953. The key to the Code's definition of duplicate is that
the copy be "so accurately reproduced as to eliminate almost every
283. Wicker v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 31 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1947).
284. "'Writings' and 'recordings' include letters, words, or numbers, or their equiva-
lent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, magnetic
impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation, upon paper,
wood, stone, recording tape, or other materials." FLA. STAT. § 90.951(1) (Supp. 1976).
285. "'Photographs' include still photographs, x-ray films, videotapes, and motion
picutres." FLA. STAT. § 90.951(2) (Supp. 1976).
286. An "original" of a writing or recording means the writing or recording
itself, or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing
or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print
made from it. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or
other output readable by sight and shown to reflect the data accurately is an
"original." FA. STAT. § 90.951(3) (Supp. 1976).
287. "Duplicate" includes:
(a) A counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, from the
same matrix; by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures;
by mechanical or electronic re-recording; by chemical reproduction; or by other
equivalent technique that accurately reproduces the original; or
(b) An executed carbon copy not intended by the parties to be an original.
FA. STAT. § 90.951(4) (Supp. 1976).
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possibility of error.1218 Manually reproduced copies such as would
be produced by handwriting or typing are not contemplated within
this definition.
Section 952 states the best evidence rule as: "Except as other-
wise provided by statute, an original writing, recording, or photo-
graph is required [in order] to prove the contents of the writing,
recording, or photograph." The Sponsors' Note refers to the Uni-
form Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evi-
dence Act s1 as an example of the statutory exception to the produc-
tion of the original. This is confusing since the Uniform Photo-
graphic Copies Act is repealed by the Code."' It is not clear why the
legislature repealed the Uniform Act. Perhaps it felt that the Act
was rendered unnecessary since section 953 now admits duplicates
to the same extent as originals. If this were the reason, however, the
other statutory exceptions" s listed in the Sponsors' Notes to section
952 and 953 are redundant. Whatever the reasons for repealing the
Uniform Act, the Sponsors' Notes' reference to it is misleading.
When the original and any duplicates of a writing are lost,
destroyed, unavailable, in the control of the party against whom
offered, or not related to a controlling issue, section 954 permits
other evidence of the writing's contents to be offered. This provision
eliminates the pre-Code practice of determining degrees of second-
ary evidence that may be used in such cases22 and will greatly
simplify the presentation of proof when the originals are excusably
unavailable.
Section 955 provides for the admissibility of certified copies of
public records that are actually recorded or filed with a governmen-
tal agency. Section 956 permits use of summaries of voluminous
writings if presented by a qualified witness who actually performs
the summarization and if the originals are made available to the
288. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.951(4) (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
289. FLA. STAT. § 92.35 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237.
290. 1976 FLA. LAws ch. 76-237.
291. Other provisions of the Florida Statutes which allow for admissibility of duplicates
include: section 15.16(2) (1975) (records of the Department of State); section 18.20(4) (records
of the State Treasurer); section 28.30(4) (vouchers and cancelled warrants of the clerk of the
circuit court); section 229.781(1) (Department of Education records); section 230.331(2) (dis-
trict school records) sections 320.833(3), 321.23(3) (records of Department of Highway Safety
and Motor Vehicles).
292. See the Sponsors' Note to section 954 for a discussion of the cases which established
this practice. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.954 (West Special Pamphlet 1976), Sponsors' Note.
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opponent with timely notice for inspection.
Section 957 allows a party to avoid the best evidence rule if he
can prove the contents of the writing by the testimony or the admis-
sions of the party against whom it is being offered. Section 958
completes the best evidence rule by procedurally dividing up the
functions for it between the court and the jury. Preliminary matters
of fact affecting admissibility of a writing are determined by the
court while the ultimate determination as to the contents of the
writing or if it ever actually existed is a matter for the jury.
The Code's approach to the best evidence rule is very similar
to that of the Federal Rules. 3 It represents some improvement over
the prior Florida rule and should simplify this area of the law.
XI. CONCLUSION
There was considerable resistance by many of the members of
the trial bar to the concept of codifying the rules of evidence. For
the present, at least, it appears that the Code is something with
which we must learn to live. It is sincerely hoped that this article
will simplify the task of learning and living with the Code.
293. FED. R. EVID. 1001-08.
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